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TEN WAYS STATES CAN COMBAT OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION (AND WHY THEY SHOULD)
Ryan P. Kelly† & Margaret R. Caldwell†
ABSTRACT: The ocean is becoming more acidic worldwide as a result of
increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and other
pollutants. This fundamental change is likely to have substantial ecological and
economic consequences globally. In this Article, we provide a toolbox for
understanding and addressing the drivers of ocean acidification. We begin with
an overview of the relevant science, highlighting known causes of chemical
change in the coastal ocean. Because of the difficulties associated with
controlling diffuse atmospheric pollutants such as CO2, we then focus on
controlling smaller-scale agents of acidification, discussing ten legal and policy
tools that state government agencies can use to mitigate the problem. This
bottom-up approach does not solve the global CO2 problem, but instead offers a
more immediate means of addressing the challenges of a rapidly changing ocean.
States have ample legal authority to address many of the causes of ocean
acidification; what remains is to implement that authority to safeguard our
iconic coastal resources.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Ocean acidification is known as “the other CO2 problem,”1

1. Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV.
MARINE SCI. 169, 170 (2009).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/5

2

Kelly and Caldwell: Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Shou

2016]

TEN WAYS TO COMBAT OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

289

because it has received less attention than climate change but
is similarly caused by rising levels of atmospheric carbon
dioxide (“CO2”). Because the ocean absorbs roughly one-third of
the CO2 that humans release into the atmosphere annually,2 it
is significantly more acidic than it was during the
preindustrial era.3 This more acidic ocean has begun to
dissolve the shells and other hard parts of marine organisms
and threatens to change fundamentally the marine ecosystems
on which a large fraction of the world depends for sustenance, 4
recreation, and a host of other services.5
This environmental issue has national and international
implications, reaching beyond the coastal states whose shores
are most directly threatened. One report estimates that
“[m]ore than one third of the world’s population will be
strongly affected by acidification,”6 and a recent draft strategic
research plan from the National Science and Technology
Council notes that “ocean acidification has the potential to
increase instability in regions of the world where the effects of
decreasing pH on marine life will threaten the food supply of
over one billion people.”7 These challenges demand
governmental action to address acidification in order to
mitigate current and impending harms to fisheries,
shellfisheries, and the communities that depend upon them.
Ocean acidification is a large-scale environmental problem
that arises from a classic externality problem: Rising

2. Id. at 170.
3. ROYAL SOC’Y, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING CARBON DIOXIDE vi
(2005), www.royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/RoyalSocietyContent/policy/publications/20
05/9634.pdf.
4. The people of some countries (including Indonesia, Cambodia, and Bangladesh)
depend upon seafood for more than 50% of their protein; many more countries receive
at least 15% of their dietary protein from seafood. Sarah R. Cooley et al., Ocean
Acidification’s Potential to Alter Global Marine Ecosystem Services, 22 OCEANOGRAPHY
172, 172–73, 177 (2009) (citing FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF
FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE (2008), www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0250e/i0250e00.htm).
5. Id. at 172.
6. ELLYCIA HARROULD-KOLIEB ET AL., OCEANA, MAJOR EMITTERS AMONG HARDEST
HIT BY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF ACIDIFICATION ON THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 2 (2009), http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/Acidity_Vulner
ability_Risk_report_2.pdf.
7. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FEDERAL RESEARCH AND MONITORING OF OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION 70 (2012), www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/iwgoa/DRAFT_Ocean_Acidification_
Strategic_Research_Plan.pdf.
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atmospheric CO2 concentrations cause wholesale changes to
ocean chemistry worldwide, but larger CO2-emitters do not
experience greater harm than do lesser emitters.8 Worse, the
problem has been invisible until very recently. Although it has
long been known that the ocean absorbs large volumes of
atmospheric CO2,9 only in the last fifteen years has the
resulting change in acidity received significant scientific
attention.10 The past ten years have seen an explosion of
primary scientific literature,11 but little legal analysis or
commentary on ocean acidification. As a result, the legal and
policy options lag behind the science even as improved
understanding of the phenomenon opens up new policy
avenues to combat the global change.
Fixing the problem of ocean acidification will ultimately
require that we fix the atmospheric CO2 problem. Humanity
must stop pouring tens of billions of metric tons of CO2 into the
air each year. But while the atmospheric CO2 problem has
been the subject of much discussion over the past two
decades,12 a legislative solution is still nowhere on the horizon
in the United States. That we have failed to regulate CO2
domestically is not surprising, given the institutional
incentives and vested interests aligned against the change.13

8. That is, emitters as individuals do not experience harm in proportion to their
emissions. As nations, however, the story is quite different: A 2009 Oceana report
found that nations with the highest emissions tended to be the most vulnerable to
harm from ocean acidification. See HARROULD-KOLIEB ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. Six of
the top ten emitting nations were also among the top twenty-five most vulnerable
nations. Id. This analysis suggests the existence of direct incentives for these and
other nations to minimize their CO2 emissions. The authors estimated vulnerability
using fish consumption per capita, coral reef area as percentage of exclusive economic
zone (“EEZ”), total catch within EEZ, and oceanographic parameters. Id. at 6.
9. See Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between
Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO 2 During the
Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18, 19 (1957) (citing SVANTE ARRHENIUS, LEHRBUCH DER
KOSMISCHEN PHYSIK (1903)).
10. See generally Joan A. Kleypas et al., Geochemical Consequences of Increased
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide on Coral Reefs, 284 SCI. 118 (1999).
11. At least 174 scientific papers on ocean acidification were published in 2011 alone.
Web-of-Science BIOSIS Previews search for topic (“ocean acidification”) and timespan
(“2011”), WEBOFKNOWLEDGE.COM (last searched Nov. 28, 2012).
12. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, CONTRIBUTIONS OF WORKING GROUPS I, II, AND III
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT] and its many citing references.
13. See, e.g., Steven Mufson, Climate Change Debate Hinges on Economics, WASH.
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Kyoto and hopeful hints from Durban notwithstanding, the
prospects for an international accord for regulating greenhouse
gases into the future are similarly bleak.14
Given this domestic gridlock, it makes sense to focus on
smaller units of government as the prime movers on
environmental issues. This is not a new idea, and particularly
not with respect to CO2 and climate change. Within the United
States, cities, counties, and states have moved towards
limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the absence of federal
leadership.15 Regional climate initiatives play similar roles on
somewhat larger spatial scales.16 And while the jury is still out
on whether these efforts will curb the stratospheric rise in
emissions,17 such sub-national progress is progress nonetheless
and helps demonstrate the efficacy of mechanisms that could
be adopted more widely.
What makes ocean acidification particularly amenable to
smaller-scale mitigation is that many existing legal tools are
available and up to the task. Even if we still lack the fortitude
to tackle CO2 emissions at a large spatial scale, fast-moving
science—in significant part funded by the United States
federal government—continues to reveal important details
about the mechanisms driving changes to the ocean’s
chemistry. Those details, in turn, suggest new means of
POST, Jul. 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/
14/AR2007071401246.html (discussing the then-current legislative proposals for a capand-trade system to limit emissions, and noting that such a system “would alter the
calculations of almost every business; hundreds of billions of dollars of energy
investments would be redirected”).
14. See, e.g., Climate Change: The Other Greenhouse Gases, THE ECONOMIST
BABBAGE SCI. & TECH. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2012), www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2012/
02/climate-change (“The UN’s climate change summit in Durban last December
confirmed how far the world is from limiting its emissions of carbon dioxide, the main
greenhouse gas. Everyone agrees that this must be done, but not on who, exactly,
should do it.”).
15. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2008); R. B.
McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems, 12 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004).
16. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United
States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005).
17. Global emissions in 2010 were the highest on record for the industrial age, and
the current atmospheric concentration of CO2 is the highest in at least 800,000 years.
See Carbon Budget: Atmospheric CO2 Growth, GLOBAL CARBON PROJECT, http://www.
globalcarbonproject.org/carbon_budget/12/hl-full.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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ameliorating the effects of acidification using tools already in
our legal toolbox, in large part by addressing ancillary
environmental degradation and thus shoring up shoreline
ecosystems’ ability to survive despite an acidifying ocean.
In this Article, we briefly review the science of ocean
acidification and explain why it poses a fundamental challenge
to ocean ecosystems and many of the services those systems
provide. We next review federal and international actions in
response, finding that most of these focus on research rather
than action. To address this shortfall, we then summarize the
tools available to state, tribal, and local governments to
respond to acidification, discussing ten specific points of action.
These points focus primarily on water quality but also include
air quality, state environmental impact statutes, common law
causes of action, and changes in land use.18
Focusing on governance at smaller spatial scales changes
the calculus of incentives. Accordingly, we emphasize actions
more closely aligned with local benefits, identifying incentives
tailored to the appropriate spatial scale. Such a bottom-up
strategy does not solve the global CO2 problem but instead
offers a way forward on an otherwise (seemingly) intractable
problem. We hope to provide a means of buying time and
improving the quality of state waters, to minimize the
economic and environmental impacts of acidification in the
near term. In the background, of course, is the fact that we
cannot solve ocean acidification without solving the global CO2
emissions problem.
II.

THE SCIENCE OF OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

1.

Chemistry

Atmospheric CO2 dissolves in water, making it more acidic;19
this process is why, for example, carbonated soda water is
18. We note that acidification also threatens the Great Lakes and other freshwater
bodies. We concentrate here on marine protection, but many of the approaches to
mitigating ocean acidification apply equally well to management of the Great Lakes
and similar systems. Furthermore, although the examples in this Article are primarily
drawn from California and Washington, both of which are heavily reliant on coastal
and marine resources and services, we believe that the suggestions we provide may be
readily applied in any coastal state that seeks to combat the effects of ocean
acidification.
19. ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 3, at vi.
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more acidic than regular tap water. Since the industrial
revolution, this phenomenon has played out on a global scale:
The oceans have become more acidic as they have absorbed a
large portion of the anthropogenic increase in atmospheric
carbon dioxide.20 This change threatens to disrupt large-scale
marine ecosystems and the economic and social activities that
depend upon them,21 in part because the shells and other hard
parts of marine animals dissolve more readily in more acidic
water.22 Acidified water from the deep ocean is also reaching
into shallower depths more than it did in the past,23 and
because the rate at which atmospheric CO2 is increasing
continues to increase, the rate at which we are changing the
ocean’s chemistry is increasing in kind.24 These changes are
now well documented, and there is a broad scientific consensus
that increasing atmospheric CO2 is the primary mechanism
driving the observed change. Deposition of sulfur oxides (“SOx”)
and nitrogen oxides (“NOx”)—familiar as the causes of acid
rain—could also directly lower ocean pH as these acidifying
compounds dissolve in coastal waters.25
Indirect drivers of ocean acidification include nutrient
20. Doney et al., supra note 1, at 170.
21. Id. at 184.
22. Id. at 174.
23. This is known as “shoaling” of more corrosive waters. See, e.g., Claudine Hauri et
al., Ocean Acidification in the California Current System, 22 OCEANOGRAPHY 60, 69
(2009). Note that more acidic water from the deep ocean routinely comes to the surface
near the coastal margins as a result of normal upwelling processes, but upwelled water
appears to have become more acidic as a result of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. See
infra note 32.
24. See Ken Caldeira & Michael E. Wickett, Anthropogenic Carbon and Ocean pH,
425 NATURE 365, 365 (2003).
25. Scott C. Doney et al., Impact of Anthropogenic Atmospheric Nitrogen and Sulfur
Deposition on Ocean Acidification and the Inorganic Carbon System, 104 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIENCES 14,580, 14,583 (2007). Note that this deposition is likely to be a more
prominent factor on the east coast of the United States, where coal-fired power plants
are much more common, than on the west coast. We note also that the effects of SOx
and NOx deposition on ocean chemistry are still subjects of active research, with at
least one publication suggesting these effects are minimal. See Keith A. Hunter et al.,
Impacts of Anthropogenic SOx, NOx and NH3 on Acidification of Coastal Waters and
Shipping Lanes, 38 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, July 2011 (L13602), at 1. Our purpose
here is not to declare the importance of these atmospheric acid gases to coastal ocean
acidification, but rather to highlight the tools that are available for mitigating these
pollutants in the event that they prove to be substantial contributors to the problem.
Even where these gases do not contribute to ocean acidification, they nevertheless
remain important air pollutants for which emissions reductions are desirable on
environmental and public health grounds.
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runoff, which plays an important role in altering marine
carbonate chemistry.26 Nutrient pollution causes local
acidification through feedback loops involving biological
growth, metabolism, and decay, over and above that which
would occur in the absence of nutrient input from humans.27
These processes use more oxygen than they produce, causing
oxygen minimum zones (“dead zones”), and resulting in locally
acidified waters.28 More acidic, lower-oxygen waters are likely
to undergo both chronic and acute environmental changes,
including a decline in biomass productivity, a factor important
to fisheries.29
The root causes of acidification—including atmospheric CO2,
nutrient runoff, and SOx and NOx deposition—interact with
oceanography to create a patchwork of coastal effects.30 In
“upwelling zones”—areas along continental margins where
colder, more acidic water from the deep ocean is drawn up to
regions such as the west coast of the United States—local
“hotspots” of ocean acidification develop.31 Upwelling is a
normal oceanographic process, but upwelled water appears to
have become more acidic as a result of dissolved anthropogenic
CO2.32 This more corrosive water is already apparent at the
surface in upwelling zones near Cape Mendocino in northern
26. Nutrient runoff may have an even greater effect on marine carbonate chemistry
than increased CO2 in some cases. See generally Alberto V. Borges & Nathalie Gypens,
Carbonate Chemistry in the Coastal Zone Responds More Strongly to Eutrophication
than to Ocean Acidification, 55 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 346 (2010) (modeling
the relative impacts of nutrient loading and CO2-driven acidification in the Belgian
Coastal Zone, and finding significantly greater effects of nutrient runoff than
atmospheric CO2 on ocean pH).
27. Wei-Jun Cai et al., Acidification of Subsurface Coastal Waters Enhanced by
Eutrophication, 4 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 766, 766 (2011).
28. See Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and
Consequences for Marine Ecosystems, 321 SCI. 926, 926 (2008).
29. Id. at 927.
30. Changes to the hydrologic cycle—for example, the changes in freshwater runoff
predicted in northern California due to climate change—will also influence the
distribution of acidified hotspots in the coastal ocean. See Mark A. Snyder & Lisa C.
Sloan, Transient Future Climate Over the Western United States Using a Regional
Climate Model, 9 EARTH INTERACTIONS, July 2005, at 1 (predicting changes in
precipitation patterns in northern California toward the end of the twenty-first
century).
31. See Ryan P. Kelly et al., Mitigating Local Causes of Ocean Acidification with
Existing Laws, 332 SCI. 1036, 1036 (2011).
32. See Richard A. Feely et al., Evidence for Upwelling of Corrosive “Acidified” Water
onto the Continental Shelf, 320 SCI. 1490, 1490 (2008).
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California and is likely present at other prominent rocky
headlands along the west coast.33 Rising atmospheric CO2 and
patchy upwelling along the shore are the baseline to which we
add other stressors such as nutrient runoff.
At present, we cannot attribute a particular fraction of the
observed change in coastal waters to any given causal factor
(e.g., atmospheric CO2 or nutrient runoff),34 although in
principle this will become possible as more data become
available. While CO2 is the primary driver of the global
background change in ocean pH, non-CO2 inputs may be more
influential in specific coastal regions.35
Overall, there is a strong consensus that:
1) Coastal acidification is more severe and rapid in some
places due to oceanographic features, biological effects,
and land-based pollutants;36
2) The chemical changes to the coastal ocean are due to a
combination of atmospheric CO2 and other pollutants,
including atmospheric deposition of sulfur and nitrogen
compounds, and terrestrial nutrient runoff, as well as
possible changes in freshwater input and upwelling;37

33. Id. at 1490 fig. 1 (showing corrosive waters at several coastal locations).
34. In part, this difficulty stems from the large natural variation in coastal waters.
Shallow ocean waters, bays, and estuaries experience fluctuations of pH and related
measures over the course of hours and days. These rapid swings are driven by tides,
freshwater input, photosynthesis, shell formation, and respiration, among other
factors. See generally RICHARD E. ZEEBE & DIETER WOLF-GLADROW, CO2 IN SEAWATER:
EQUILIBRIUM, KINETICS, ISOTOPES (2001). For an example of these changes in the
intertidal zone on the exposed Washington coast, see Timothy J. Wootton, et al.,
Dynamic Patterns and Ecological Impacts of Declining Ocean pH in a High-Resolution
Multi-Year Dataset, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 18,848 (2008). Daily and
monthly variation in pH at a given coastal site may be of larger magnitude than the
entire observed change in baseline ocean pH due to anthropogenic CO 2, and such
natural variability poses a challenge for discerning the effects of pollution from natural
background variation at small scales. Id.; Li-Qing Jiang et al., Carbonate Mineral
Saturation States Along the U.S. East Coast, 55 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 2424,
2425 (2010). For example, in upwelling zones, pH can vary between 8.1 and 7.7 within
a week. Gretchen Hofmann et al., High-Frequency Dynamics of Ocean pH: A MultiEcosystem Comparison, 6 PLOS ONE, Dec. 2011 (e28983) at 4. By contrast, it is
estimated that the global ocean pH change due to anthropogenic CO 2 input is 0.1 pH
units. Feely et al., supra note 32, at 1490.
35. See Doney et al., supra note 25, at 14,583; Richard A. Feely et al., The Combined
Effects of Ocean Acidification, Mixing, and Respiration on pH and Carbonate
Saturation in an Urbanized Estuary, 88 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 442, 442
(2010); Borges & Gypens, supra note 26, at 350–52.
36. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 31, at 1036.
37. See Snyder & Sloan, supra note 30 (showing predicted changes in precipitation,
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and
Acidification adds yet another stressor to a growing list
of threats to ocean health—including overfishing,
habitat destruction, and climate change.38 Acidification
could alter marine food webs substantially,39 which may
undermine the nearshore ecosystem’s ability to produce
goods and services worth billions of dollars annually.
We have already observed changes in marine ecosystems as a
result of increasingly acidic waters. More change is inevitable,
both because of lag time associated with ocean circulation
patterns40 and because humanity’s CO2 emissions are unlikely
to decline suddenly and precipitously. However, mitigating the
causes of ocean acidification at present will pay dividends
immediately and in the future, safeguarding a public resource
that is a critical center of biological diversity, cultural value,
and economic benefit to local communities.
3)

2.

Ecology and Biology

An ecosystem is the entire set of interactions among species,
including humans, and nonliving components of an
environment, such as temperature or sunlight.41 Given the
and hence freshwater input, in northern California as a result of climate change);
Marisol Garcia-Reyes & John L. Largier, Observations of Increased Wind-Driven
Coastal Upwelling Off Central California, 115 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Apr. 2011
(C04011), at 1 (noting that observed increases in coastal upwelling are consistent with
model predictions due to climate change; more persistent or more extreme upwelling
would also acidify coastal waters).
38. See, e.g., Robin K. Craig & J. B. Ruhl, Governing for Sustainable Coasts, 2
SUSTAINABILITY 1361, 1364 (2010).
39. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION: A THREAT TO FOOD SECURITY 1 (2010), www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/
pdf/Ocean_Acidification.pdf.
40. Ocean water absorbs CO2 from the atmosphere at the surface. After being
submerged and transported by deep ocean currents, a particular water molecule may
take decades to reach the surface again. Upwelling along the Pacific coast brings water
to the surface that was last in contact with the atmosphere perhaps fifty years ago. To
some extent, we are now experiencing acidification from the atmospheric CO 2 of the
1960s. This lag time postpones some of the effects of today’s emissions, which are much
larger than those of decades past. Feely et al., supra note 32, at 1492.
41. Arthur Tansley is credited with coining the term “ecosystem” in 1935 to include
“not only the organism-complex, but also the whole complex of physical factors forming
what we call the environment of the biome—the habitat factors in the widest sense.”
Arthur G. Tansley, The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms, 16
ECOLOGY 284, 299 (1935). The term has been widely re-defined since, but retains a
core meaning of an inclusive concept of the factors that affect living organisms on
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complexity of marine ecosystems, it is unsurprising that
ecological effects of an acidifying ocean remain poorly
understood relative to the chemistry described above. While
adding dissolved CO2 to the ocean has predictable effects on
the ocean’s chemistry, there is considerably more we need to
learn about the effects of the ocean’s chemistry on the coastal
ecosystem.
One acidification-related metric of great importance for
coastal ecosystems is the relative propensity of many marine
organisms’ hard parts (such as mollusc shells) to dissolve in
seawater.42 As waters acidify, these hard parts have a greater
tendency to dissolve. A growing body of research documents
the negative impacts of acidified waters on organismal
development,43 suggesting that acidification in the coastal
ocean has the potential to disrupt a wide swath of ecosystem
functions. Because juveniles belonging to oyster and related
species are especially susceptible to acidification, the shellfish
industry is facing an imminent threat. Various industry groups
have already taken action to understand and combat the
changes that face them.44
More broadly, we do know that a more acidic ocean is likely
to hinder growth in a wide variety of species, to increase the
growth rate of some others, and to have little effect on still
others.45 At least under laboratory conditions, acidified
Earth.
42. The measure of this propensity is known as the saturation state of calcium
carbonate, the material of which most species’ hard parts are made. It is symbolized by
a capital omega (Ω), and differs depending upon the particular form of calcium
carbonate to which it refers. The principal forms are aragonite and calcite, written
Ωarag and Ωcalcite, respectively. Aragonite is more soluble and therefore under greater
threat from ocean acidification. Therefore, Ωarag is a primary factor of interest.
43. See, e.g., Victoria J. Fabry et al., Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine Fauna
and Ecosystem Processes, 65 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 414 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Eric Scigliano, The Great Oyster Crash, ONEARTH (Aug 17, 2011),
www.onearth.org/article/oyster-crash-ocean-acidification; Janet Krenn, Virginia’s
Oyster Industry Taking Proactive Steps to Stay on Top, VA. INST. MARINE SCI. (Nov. 10,
2011), www.vims.edu/newsandevents/topstories/oyster_acid.php (covering a recent
ocean acidification workshop at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science).
45. See Justin B. Ries et al., Marine Calcifiers Exhibit Mixed Responses to CO2Induced Ocean Acidification, 37 GEOLOGY 1131, 1131 (2009) (demonstrating
developmental response to undersaturated seawater in eighteen species; of these, ten
species had decreased calcification rates, seven had increased rates, and one had no
response); Stephanie C. Talmage & Christopher J. Gobler, Effects of Past, Present, and
Future Ocean Carbon Dioxide Concentrations on the Growth and Survival of Larval
Shellfish, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 17,246, 17,246 (2010) (demonstrating
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seawater hampers calcification and reproduction in most
animal species studied, and has either neutral or positive
effects on photosynthesizing species. Species with already
marginal survival rates may be at special risk; for example,
acidification further threatens the already-imperiled pinto
abalone, whose larvae develop less successfully in a high-CO2
environment.46
Changing the chemical environment could alter the
ecological interactions that underpin the living ocean we see
today by, for example, changing the balance of power in
predator-prey relationships and in competition among
species.47 Commercially important effects of this phenomenon
include a significant decrease in salmon biomass in waters
where a major food source of juvenile salmon is highly
susceptible to acidified waters.48 Direct human health impacts
may include amnesic shellfish poisoning as a result of
increased frequency and severity of harmful algal blooms,
spurred by a high-CO2 ocean.49
In short, while there is little uncertainty surrounding the
chemistry of ocean acidification, the biological and ecosystem
effects of those chemical changes are not yet as well
understood. However, the impacts are potentially grave for
both the ecosystems themselves and the human communities
that depend on them.50
decreased and slower growth in two bivalve shellfish under modern CO2 conditions as
compared with preindustrial conditions); Fabry et al., supra note 43, at 423–24. See
generally Kristy J. Kroeker et al., Meta-Analysis Reveals Negative Yet Variable Effects
of Ocean Acidification on Marine Organisms, 13 ECOLOGY LETTERS 1419 (2010).
46. Ryan N. Crim et al., Elevated Seawater CO2 Concentrations Impair Larval
Development and Reduce Larval Survival in Endangered Northern Abalone (Haliotis
kamtschatkana), 400 J. EXPERIMENTAL MARINE BIOLOGY & ECOLOGY 272, 274 (2011).
47. For example, decreased shell thickness and strength in mussels under acidified
conditions may make species more vulnerable to predation and breaking waves. Brian
Gaylord et al., Functional Impacts of Ocean Acidification in an Ecologically Critical
Foundation Species, 214 J. EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY 2586, 2592 (2011).
48. See Fabry et al, supra note 43, at 426.
49. Acidified waters facilitate faster growth rates of harmful algal species, as well as
greater concentrations of domoic acid—the toxin that causes amnesic shellfish
poisoning in humans—within algal cells. Jun Sun et al., Effects of Changing pCO2 and
Phosphate Availability on Domoic Acid Production and Physiology of the Marine
Harmful Bloom Diatom Pseudo-nitzschia Multiseries, 56 LIMNOLOGY &
OCEANOGRAPHY 829, 829 (2011).
50. Of course, species have the capacity to evolve in response to environmental
change, typically over long time horizons. One emerging question is whether and how
today’s species will evolve in response to ocean acidification. One recent study
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III. FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The United States government has begun to take notice of
the acidifying ocean in small but important ways. In 2009,
Congress passed legislation focused on ocean acidification,51
establishing a federal interagency working group on the issue52
and a research program within the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric
Administration
(“NOAA”).53
The
Ocean
Acidification Task Force (“OA Task Force”), consisting of a
collection of independent scientists and policymakers,54 was
convened to provide advice to the interagency working group.
The National Research Council has also issued a report55 in
response to a Congressional mandate in the 2006 MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.56 This

estimates the different evolutionary capacities of two important nearshore species—
red sea urchins (Strongylocentrotus franciscanus) and mussels (Mytilus trossulus)—
and concludes the urchin species has a much greater capacity to adapt to acidified
conditions. Jennifer M. Sunday et al., Quantifying Rates of Evolutionary Adaptation in
Response to Ocean Acidification, 6 PLOS ONE, Aug. 2011 (e22881), at 1. This work is
the beginning of a larger effort to unravel the evolutionary consequences of
acidification, and highlights the ecosystem changes that are inevitable as human
pollution creates winners and losers among species in the coastal ocean.
51. Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring (“FOARAM”) Act, 33
U.S.C. §§3701–08 (2009) (authorizing funding, developing interagency plan on ocean
acidification, and establishing an acidification program within the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration).
52. See
INTERAGENCY
WORKING
GROUP
ON
OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION,
www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/iwgoa/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library). This working group has now developed a draft strategic plan for
research on ocean acidification. See supra note 7.
53. See NOAA OA [Ocean Acidification] Plan, NOAA, www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/
NOAA+OA+Plan (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
54. The OA Task Force operates under the purview of the Ocean Research and
Resources Advisory Panel (“ORRAP”), an advisory body that offers “independent
advice and recommendations to the heads of federal agencies with ocean-related
missions.” OCEAN ACIDIFICATION TASK FORCE, SUMMARY OF WORK COMPLETED AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ORRAP TO CONVEY TO THE IWGOA 2 (2011), www.nopp.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/03/OATF-REPORT-FINAL-4-21-11.pdf.
55. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION: A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO
MEET THE CHALLENGES OF A CHANGING OCEAN (2010), https://download.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=12904. See also NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL JOINT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEAN SCI. & TECH., CHARTING THE COURSE FOR OCEAN SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NEXT DECADE: AN OCEAN RESEARCH PRIORITIES PLAN
AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY (2007), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/nstc-orppis.pdf.
56. P.L. 109–479 § 701.
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report is an important marker, consolidating the available
scientific
information
and
identifying
outstanding
uncertainties to guide future research.57
Federal research dollars have increasingly gone to support
primary research on ocean acidification in the past two years.
One metric for this rise is the number of National Science
Foundation (“NSF”) grants given to ocean acidification
research: Of the 177 grants with the phrase “ocean
acidification” in the title or abstract of the award, 176 of them
(99.5%) have been awarded since 2006.58 The overall amount of
grant money awarded has increased sharply in recent years:
Between 2006 and 2008, NSF awarded a total of $ 19.7 million
for ocean acidification research, while that number more than
tripled between 2009 and 2011, rising to $ 74.4 million.59 The
results of this investment have been immediate and tangible,
as the number of publications on ocean acidification has
skyrocketed since 2006.60 Fully one-half of the primary
scientific literature on ocean acidification has been published
in 2011-12 alone,61 a sign of tremendous growth in this area of

57. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 2. The report also notes that “the
federal government has taken initial steps to respond to the nation’s long-term needs
and . . . the national ocean acidification program currently in development is a positive
move toward coordinating these efforts.” Id. at 6.
58. The increase in per-year awards is also striking: 11 in 2006, 9 in 2007, 14 in
2008, 37 in 2009, 58 in 2010, 48 in 2011, and 50 in 2012. Awards Advanced Search,
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., www.nsf.gov/awardsearch (advanced search “ocean acidification”
by award year) (search performed on Jan. 13, 2013) (results on file with authors).
59. This total does not include a $148 million grant to the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks, for shipyard construction costs (award number 939812). See Award
Abstract 939812, Construction and Operation of the Alaska Region Research Vessel:
Phase III - Shipyard Construction Costs, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (last amended Mar. 7,
2012),
http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWDID=0939812&Historical
Awards=false.
60. Google Scholar provides only a rough gauge of the trajectory of this publication
boom (due to multiple entries for the same publication, and other problems), but
captures a wider spectrum of publications than purely academic search tools (see
BIOSIS search, infra, note 61). GOOGLE SCHOLAR reports that of 9280 total
publications responding to the search term “ocean acidification,” 7340 (79%) have been
published since 2006. GOOGLE SCHOLAR, www.scholar.google.com (search “ocean
acidification”) (search performed Dec. 6, 2011) (results on file with authors). 6410
(69%) have come since 2008, and nearly half (3990, 43%) have come since 2010. Id.
61. A search of BIOSIS—an authoritative database for scientific publications—finds
that 384 of 664 total records for the topic “ocean acidification” were published in 2011
and 2012 (57.8%). Web of Knowledge, www.webofknowledge.com (record search “ocean
acidification”) (search performed on Jan. 13, 2013) (results on file with authors).
Another 119 (17.9%) were published in 2010, and 85 (12.8%) in 2009. Id.
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research.
Other nations have responded to ocean acidification in a
similar fashion to the United States, sponsoring research and
collaboration among scientists.62 Germany’s BIOACID
program, for example, explores the responses of marine species
to an acidifying ocean and to multiple related stressors.63
China, Japan, and Korea have programs that do likewise.64
The European Project on Ocean Acidification (“EPOCA”), now
completed, was an international collaboration among 27
European member organizations focusing on primary research
issues and education.65
These national and international actions highlight the
importance of ocean acidification and have already proved
crucial in generating the research that underpins our
understanding of the phenomenon. However, every one of
these efforts goes towards documenting and understanding
what we already know is a problem; not one affirmatively
begins to fix the problem of ocean acidification. In large part,
this lack of action is likely due to the daunting mismatch of
incentives that has plagued efforts to reduce CO2 emissions
and other pollutants.
Below, we provide some concrete first steps that local and
state governments can take now to mitigate the causes and
effects of coastal ocean acidification. As we note above, these
smaller spatial scales offer an immediate way forward, buying
time while work progresses on a global CO2 solution. We focus
on domestic laws of the United States, with a special emphasis
on California because of its extensive water quality laws and
economically important coastal resources.

62. See generally Heidi R. Lamirande, From Sea to Carbon Cesspool, 34 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 183, 198–205 (2011) (reviewing foreign jurisdictions’ ocean
acidification laws, as well as the applicability of international law).
63. See Biological Impacts of Ocean Acidification, BIOACID, www.bioacid.de (last
visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
64. Lamirande, supra note 62, at 201–02.
65. See EPOCA Web Site, EUROPEAN PROJECT ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION,
www.epoca-project.eu (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
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IV.

INCENTIVES AND RATIONALE FOR SUB-NATIONAL
ACTION

Coastal regions are where ecosystems are most productive,66
where most people live,67 and, accordingly, where there is the
largest nexus of human-environment interaction and
dependence. Furthermore, newly available information shows
that auxiliary (non-CO2) drivers can contribute substantially to
an acidified condition in some localities, and that these drivers
have the most impact in coastal regions. This is (relatively
speaking) good news: It means that important problems near
shore are the easier ones to fix, because these auxiliary
stressors derive from local and identifiable sources, rather
than global and diffuse CO2. Reducing such stressors also
contribute to the resilience of coastal ecosystems, bolstering
their ability to endure the increasingly acidic ocean
environment.68
The more we learn about the mechanisms of a particular
environmental problem, the more legal hooks we can identify
to address it. This relationship is in many ways analogous to
the relationship between medical research and drug
development: More details on precisely how a disease works
yields more points of entry for a potential drug to disrupt the
disease’s progress. Taking the analogy one step further, it is
much cheaper, faster, and easier to use existing drugs to fight
off new diseases than it is to develop new drugs. Existing laws
function in much the same way. They serve as ready-made
tools that, if effective, are valuable means of addressing
emerging problems such as ocean acidification.
This analogy demonstrates the importance of new data and
reveals that attacking the problem in the nearshore
environment makes sense in at least two ways. First, reducing
66. See Francis Chan et al., Emergence of Anoxia in the California Current Large
Marine Ecosystem, 319 SCI. 920, 920 (2008).
67. For example, more than half of Americans live within fifty miles of the coast.
Ocean Facts, NOAA, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
68. See Caitlin Mullan Crain et al., Interactive and Cumulative Effects of Multiple
Human Stressors in Marine Systems, 11 ECOLOGY LETTERS 1304, 1304 (2008) (finding
that, in general, combinations of stressors on marine systems tend to harm the
ecosystem to a greater extent than the sum of the individual stressors would; this work
implies that reducing individual stressors—such as nonpoint source runoff—increases
the ability of the system to withstand other stressors such as ocean acidification).
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impacts in coastal areas could help ameliorate harm in the
sites that most urgently need attention. Second, tackling
coastal impacts is a means of mitigating some of acidification’s
effects while international and national action on CO2
progresses. As we head toward a profoundly changed world, in
which the chemistry of the ocean has seen a wholesale shift, we
must minimize the resulting societal and ecological harms in
whatever ways we can.
Fortunately, the acidification-mitigating avenues we discuss
below dovetail with existing environmental priorities. There is
little or no tradeoff between the demands of current statutes
and the means of addressing the emerging challenges of ocean
acidification. Decreasing water and air pollution has been an
important priority for many years; the new information about
acidification simply strengthens the imperative for
environmental protection of our coasts. Acting to combat the
observed and anticipated changes to the coastal ocean
therefore represents a responsible path to safeguarding our
nearshore ecosystems.
V.

INCENTIVES AND OBSTACLES TO ACTION

Focusing on the state and sub-state jurisdictional levels
eliminates any federalism concerns, because the states’ plenary
power means that they certainly have the authority to regulate
discharges and other inputs to coastal waters in the interest of
public health and safety.69 So, in general, a state could act to
ameliorate acidification by creating a more stringent
standard,70 but why should it want to?
The efforts we discuss below each depend upon the
willingness and ability of state administrative agencies to add
ocean acidification to the portfolio of issues for which they are
responsible. This is not a trivial hurdle. State environmental
regulatory agencies have substantial counterincentives to
tackling yet another environmental issue. Limited (and
shrinking) budgets may be the prime stumbling block in many

69. Federal preemption is generally not a barrier to state action in pollution
prevention and remediation. For example, both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air
Act function as floors to (rather than ceilings on) state regulation in these arenas. See
discussion infra Section VI(1).
70. But see infra note 74 for a brief discussion of the “no more stringent” laws that
exist in some states.
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cases, but institutional momentum, a workload full of existing
priorities, and the significant political costs associated with
any regulation all surely argue against taking on a new issue
such as ocean acidification. But if this were the end of the
calculation, arguably no environmental law would exist.
A fair treatment of incentives and economic efficiency is well
beyond the scope of this article, but we note that in order to
tackle ocean acidification on a local scale, a state
administrative agency’s immediate incentives to do so must
outweigh its incentives to the contrary. But even where longterm gains are likely to outweigh the short-term costs by a
large margin—such as is the case in acting to avoid
environmental harms before they become expensive or
impossible to rectify—an agency’s immediate incentives often
prevent it from acting.
As we discuss various options for state action below, we note
economic benefits that are likely to help ease the relevant
burdens. These benefits alone are unlikely to drive an agency
decision to deal with acidification, especially where
infrastructure upgrades are costly (as in the case of publicly
owned treatment works) or where the political costs of
regulation are particularly high (as in the case of nonpoint
source regulation of irrigated agriculture). However, the
primary function of state environmental agencies is to
maintain and improve the quality of the environment in which
their constituents live,71 and this function provides additional
weight to the argument for action, even where economic
incentives are insufficient drivers of change. What is more, at
the state level, environmental agencies are the only
government bodies whose job it is to deal with some of the

71. Washington State’s Department of Ecology, for example, describes its mission as
“to protect, preserve and enhance Washington’s environment, and to promote the wise
management of our air, land and water for the benefit of current and future
generations.” About Us, WASH. STATE DEP’T of ECOLOGY, www.ecy.wa.gov/about.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). South
Carolina’s Department of Natural Resources lists its mission as “serving as the
principal advocate for and steward of South Carolina’s natural resources.” History and
Purpose of the Dept. of Natural Resources, S. C. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., www.dnr.sc.gov/
admin/history.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library). The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection’s mission is
“ensuring clean air and water,” among other functions. About MassDep, MASS. DEP’T
OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, www.mass.gov/dep/about/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/5

18

Kelly and Caldwell: Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Shou

2016]

TEN WAYS TO COMBAT OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

305

causes of ocean acidification, and therefore they may be more
likely to address the problem than would be the case if they
were merely one among many agencies with overlapping
jurisdictions.72
Another important driver of action is that the harms
associated with ocean acidification, though already being felt,
will continue to worsen. Indeed, the most significant impacts
are still largely in the future. The next decade will be worse
than this decade, on average.73 As conditions deteriorate, the
problem will eventually force its way onto the agendas of
coastal resource and environmental agencies.
Perhaps through a combination of internal institutional
motivation, economic benefits of harm avoided, and leadership
from select jurisdictions with the greatest perceived threats,
state and local agencies will begin to address acidification in a
way that national and international governments have so far
failed to do. Where available, citizen suits could help this effort
along.
In addition to the ordinary obstacles that impede regulatory
action on emerging environmental problems, one particularly
notable obstacle arises where states have bound their own
hands by adopting laws that link the stringency of state
environmental regulation to the levels set by the federal
government. These laws, known as “no more stringent” rules,
effectively make federal environmental rules both a regulatory
floor (under federal law) and ceiling (under state law), and
function as barriers to state efforts to fill federal regulatory
gaps.74 Five coastal states have such laws for water quality.75

72. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this phenomenon does occur. For example, staff
members of California’s Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board took on
nonpoint source pollution creating toxic levels of pollutants in drinking water after
being reminded that if they failed to act, no one else would. Telephone Interview with
Michael Thomas, Deputy Executive Officer, Central Coast Regional Water Quality
Control Board (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with authors).
73. See generally James C. Orr et al., Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification Over the
Twenty-First Century and its Impact On Calcifying Organisms, 437 NATURE 681
(2005).
74. For a discussion of these rules and related state efforts to bolster property rights
in ways that hamper environmental regulation, see generally Andrew Hecht, Obstacles
to the Devolution of Environmental Regulation: States’ Self-Imposed Limitations on
Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM 105 (2004); Jerome M. Organ,
Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More
Stringent Than Federal Standards, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373 (1995). With respect to air
quality, twenty-six states have similar “no more stringent” laws or policies. William L.
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“No more stringent” laws probably have little practical
effect. First, in no case are these laws incorporated into state
constitutions.76 As such, state legislatures may change these
statutes—or carve out exceptions to them—by the same
procedural means as would be necessary to amend the focal
environmental laws themselves.77 In some states, the laws pose
only minor hurdles, merely requiring an administrative
justification for proposed rules that would impose stricter
pollution controls.78 In other states, case law has limited the
statute’s effect by requiring strictly comparable federal and
state regulations before weighing the relative stringency of
proposed rules.79 Finally, there remains the fact that even
states without “no more stringent” laws rarely impose
regulations beyond federal requirements,80 so as a practical
matter, whether a state has or has not expressly limited its
own power makes little difference.
The existence of “no more stringent” laws is therefore
perhaps more a marker of a state’s political attitude towards
environmental regulation than an ironclad barrier to rigorous
pollution control. Nevertheless, as we discuss below the options
for states, tribes, and local governments to combat ocean
acidification, we note that a few coastal jurisdictions will also
have to surmount their own existing “no more stringent” laws.
Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L.
& POL’Y J. 261, 302 (2008).
75. As of 2004, a total of seventeen states had general “no more stringent” laws
regarding water quality. Of these, only Florida, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, and
Pennsylvania (which has a strong influence on the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays)
are coastal. Hecht, supra note 74, at 269 n.43. Under Hecht’s ranking system, the laws
of Maine and Maryland pose only low barriers to heightened water quality
requirements, Pennsylvania and Florida have modest barriers, and Mississippi has a
significant barrier to more stringent environmental regulation. Id. at 132–33.
76. Id. at 112.
77. Id.
78. Maine, for example, has such a scheme. Id. at 122; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §
341-H(3) (A–B) (2011).
79. A Florida appellate court, for example, limited the application of that state’s “no
more stringent” statute to instances where state and federal regulations could be
easily compared. Fla. Elec. Power Coordinating Grp. v. Askew, 366 So.2d 1186, 1188
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“The federal standard must be in counterpoise to the state
standard.”). The court found that while the Clean Air Act provided such a basis for
comparison (National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards), the
Clean Water Act did not. Id.; see also Organ, supra note 74, at 1400–02 (discussing the
Askew case).
80. See Andreen, supra note 74, at 280.
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VI.

TEN SUGGESTIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL
ACTION

1.

Create More Stringent Technology-Based Clean Water Act
Standards for the Most Harmful Point Sources

States and tribes implement the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or
“the Act”)81 primarily through two mechanisms: permitting
specific levels of pollution from individual point sources
(National Pollution Discharge Elimination System or “NPDES”
permits)82 and assessing pollutant levels and allocating
tolerable pollutant loads, which, if achieved, will lead to
protection of water quality (Total Maximum Daily Loads or
“TMDLs”).83 These mechanisms function in tandem to apply
the state’s adopted water quality standards, which provide the
particular targets for legally acceptable levels of water
pollution.84 Where a water body does not meet the applicable
water quality standards, the state must list it as impaired and
develop TMDLs for the pollutants leading to the impairment.85
States thus implement the federal Clean Water Act in part by
setting water quality standards for water bodies within their
jurisdictions.86
Water quality standards for a particular water body consist
of three major parts: designated uses of the water body (e.g.,
swimming, shellfish culture, recreation), water quality criteria
(numerical or narrative limits for particular pollutants
sufficient to maintain the designated uses), and an antidegradation policy.87
However, much of the enforcement power of pollutantdischarge permits arises from federal guidelines that establish
technology-based standards for a wide variety of point

81. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
84. NPDES permit limits take the forms of technology-based limitations and water
quality-based limitations. However, water quality-based limitations only apply if the
technology-based limits are insufficient to meet the overall water quality standards. 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). This is known as the “303(d)” list.
86. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.2, 131.6 (2012).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 131.6; see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1400 (4th Cir. 1993).
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sources.88 Only when these technology-based standards are
insufficient to meet the water quality standards do the qualitybased metrics begin to have real effect. Because technologybased
standards—rather
than
water
quality-based
standards—are a primary means by which the Clean Water
Act functions, using state authority to alter or augment them
is one of the most direct means of controlling acidifying
discharges via the Act.
Although it is not explicit in the Act, states and regional
rulemaking bodies have the authority to make these
technology standards more stringent than the federal
guidelines require.89 The Act contemplates a lead role for
states in setting applicable clean water standards, and case
law supports states’ power to create more stringent standards.
For example, in Shell Oil Co. v. Train90 the Ninth Circuit noted
that:
Congress sought “to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution.” The role envisioned for
the states under the 1972 amendments is a major one,
encompassing both the opportunity to assume the
primary responsibility for the implementation and
enforcement of federal effluent discharge limitations
and the right to enact requirements which are more
stringent than the federal standards . . . . Congress
clearly intended that the states would eventually
assume the major role in the operation of the NPDES
program.91
The federal guidelines accordingly operate as a floor for clean
water protection, rather than a ceiling, and, in general, states
may make the guidelines more stringent than the federal EPA
requires.92

88. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
89. California, for example, has regional water boards that issue NPDES permits
and which have the authority to create permit limitations. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13100,
13160.
90. 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 410 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
92. Washington State, for example, has altered technology-based effluent standards
for combined waste treatment facilities and for municipal water treatment plants. See
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-220-130(a) (2012). Note that states with “no more stringent”
laws face additional hurdles. See discussion supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
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To better address the acidifying ocean, states and regional
bodies could redefine the existing technology-based discharge
standard for a subset of point sources that most strongly
contribute to ocean acidification.93 Those sources generating
low pH, high biological oxygen demand,94 or high nutrient
output—such as pulp mills, concentrated animal feeding
operations, and sewage outflows—are the most likely to
contribute to coastal acidification through their discharges. By
augmenting the federal technology-based standards to better
control effluent pH of selected categories of point sources,
states could therefore exploit a significant opportunity for
mitigation.
Developing new technology-based standards is eminently
feasible from a scientific standpoint, although political
opposition to regulation remains a hurdle. Moreover, such a
change would only address point sources, which are subject to
technology-based standards, rather than nonpoint sources,
which constitute the majority of terrestrial input to the coastal
ocean in many regions.95 Nevertheless, greater scrutiny of the
most high-risk point sources would at least partially address
coastal acidification and would have the additional benefits of
minimizing eutrophication, harmful algal blooms, and dead
zones along the coast, thus ameliorating multiple ills with a
single regulatory change.

93. EPA provides guidance for supplementing existing categorical technology-based
standards in the case of publicly owned treatment works (“POTWs”). See EPA, LOCAL
LIMITS DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE 1–3 (2004), www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/final_local_
limits_guidance.pdf (“EPA’s promulgation of categorical standards does not relieve a
POTW from its obligation to evaluate the need for and to develop local limits to meet
the general and specific prohibitions in the General Pretreatment Regulations.”).
94. Biological oxygen demand (“BOD”) is a parameter of regulatory interest where
human inputs to water bodies cause a lack of oxygen in the water due to respiration.
BOD is essentially “food” for bacteria and other microbes, which eat the available
organic compounds in the water and, by metabolism, use up the available oxygen.
Where there is less food, there is accordingly less oxygen demand. This relates to ocean
acidification because the byproduct of that metabolism is CO 2; just as we exhale, so do
marine microbes. This exhaled CO2 contributes to ocean acidification in the same way
as does atmospheric CO2. See generally Cai et al., supra note 27.
95. See generally O. A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs
and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,208 (2011). Michael
Thomas, Assistant Executive Director of California’s Central Coast Regional Water
Quality Control Board, reports that in his region, “the mass pollutant loading from
irrigated agriculture [a nonpoint source] dwarfs all other sources.” Email from Michael
Thomas, Assistant Exec. Director, Cal. Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control
Board to Ryan P. Kelly, (Nov. 4, 2011) (on file with authors).
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2.

Change Water Quality Criteria for Marine pH and
Related Parameters

More stringent water quality criteria could better protect
coastal ecosystems via implementation under existing NPDES
and TMDL programs where technology-based standards are
insufficient to safeguard the receiving waters. If enforced,
these criteria could help ameliorate the causes of locally
intensified ocean acidification. However, water quality
standards function mainly as backup rules, reinforcing the
technology-based standards that the federal EPA has
promulgated for various classes of dischargers. Only where
technology-based standards are insufficient to safeguard the
designated uses of a water body will a NPDES permit
incorporate discharge limits tied to water quality.96
In principle, TMDLs limit the overall amount of pollution—
not just that portion coming from point sources—entering a
particular water body and causing it to fall short of the
published water quality standards.97 In practice, the burden of
bringing a water body into compliance falls on the NPDESpermitted point sources rather than on nonpoint sources,
because NPDES permits for discharge into impaired waters
must be made more stringent to remedy the impairment.98
Unless states demand otherwise, nonpoint sources run up the
96. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.2, 131.6 (2012); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16
F.3d 1395, 1399–40 (4th Cir. 1993); K. M. McGaffey & K. F. Moser, Water Pollution
Control Under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, in CLEAN WATER
ACT HANDBOOK 27, 39 (M. A. Ryan ed., 3d ed., 2011).
97. TMDLs for a given pollutant are allocated between point sources and nonpoint
sources, 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i), with a margin of error to account for uncertainty, which
EPA may determine on an ad hoc basis. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski,
268 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). For a cogent encapsulation of the non-mandatory
nature of TMDLs, see City of Arcadia v. EPA, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1144–45 (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (stating that
TMDLs established under Section 303(d)(1) of the CWA function primarily as
planning devices and are not self-executing. A TMDL does not, by itself, prohibit
any conduct or require any actions. Instead, each TMDL represents a goal that
may be implemented by adjusting pollutant discharge requirements in individual
NPDES permits or establishing nonpoint source controls. Thus, a TMDL forms the
basis for further administrative actions that may require or prohibit conduct with
respect to particularized pollutant discharges and water bodies.)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
98. See Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007, 1011–15 (9th Cir. 2007)
(interpreting the Clean Water Act’s TMDL provision and its impacts on point and
nonpoint sources); see also Houck, supra note 95, at 10,210 (discussing the impact of
nonpoint regulation on point sources).
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bill, and point sources are stuck paying the check.
TMDLs thus have little in the way of mandatory authority
over existing nonpoint sources, their prime regulatory
targets.99 States could give them teeth by imposing real limits
on nonpoint source pollution. States have the sole authority to
regulate nonpoint sources under the Clean Water Act, and
therefore have the discretion to implement a TMDL’s load
allocations as they see fit.100 If accompanied by enforcement
measures, TMDLs could form the basis of nonpoint source
regulation that could significantly improve the quality of
coastal waters.101 Of course, this opportunity has been there all
along, and the failure of states to create enforceable TMDLs is
a well-known problem.102
Nevertheless, TMDLs offer some benefits even in the
absence of mandatory pollution limits. Most prominent among
these is greater protection for already-impaired water bodies,
as the TMDL bars new point source permits for discharges that
would “cause or contribute to the violation of water quality
standards.”103 This provision could be of particular use in
impaired coastal areas with increasing urban and industrial
density, forcing parties to the table to grapple with how to

99. See Houck, supra note 95, at 10,210. However, note that California’s PorterCologne Act requires even nonpoint source dischargers to file a report of each
discharge. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13260, 13269 (West 2012). Failing to file such a
report is a misdemeanor and also punishable by civil fine. CAL. WATER CODE § 13261
(West 2012). Note also that California’s regional water boards and the California
Coastal Commission accordingly see TMDLs as largely informational, rather than
regulatory. For example, California’s Nonpoint Source Implementation Plan describes
TMDLs as “planning tool[s] that will enhance the State’s ability to foster
implementation of appropriate [nonpoint source management measures]. By providing
watershed-specific information, TMDLs will help target specific sources and
corresponding corrective measures and will provide a framework for using more
stringent approaches that may be necessary to achieve water quality goals and
maintain beneficial uses.” STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. & CAL. COASTAL COMM’N,
NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM STRATEGY & IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, 1998–2013
(PROSIP), Vol. I, at ii (2000) [hereinafter PROSIP], www.coastal.ca.gov/nps/
prosipv1.pdf.
100. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002).
101. Note that the California Nonpoint Source Implementation Plan sets out sixtyone management measures (akin to best practices) that bear on various sources of
nonpoint source pollution. See PROSIP, supra note 99. These are largely voluntary,
with state-provided incentives for participation that include grants under Section
319(h) of the Clean Water Act and also waivers of waste discharge requirements. Id.
102. See Houck, supra note 95, at 10,210.
103. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2012). See also Friends of Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1011–15.
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maintain local water quality and balance its uses
appropriately. The TMDL process also generates a level of
visibility that could be helpful in the case of ocean acidification,
an issue that is still emerging into regulatory consciousness.
Finally, because our understanding of coastal acidification has
been hindered by a scarcity of reliable monitoring, the datacollection aspect of a TMDL process would also be valuable.
Because of the spatial variability inherent in the coastal
ecosystem, making blanket rules for nonpoint source pollution
could be an overbroad approach to addressing acidification.
Conversely, creating many watershed-specific rules is difficult
from a technical standpoint and is labor intensive. A
patchwork of regulation would also erode regulatory certainty
for landowners and increase their costs of gathering
information. If wide swaths of coastline share particular
chemical or ecological properties, regional-scale rules could
make both permitting and enforcement easier while effectively
improving the health of the coastal ocean.
A.

TMDLs for Non-Atmospheric Drivers of Acidification

Federal guidelines exist as baseline numerical water quality
criteria for pH, dissolved oxygen, nitrates, and phosphates,
among other acidification-relevant parameters.104 As with
technology-based standards, states are free to make their
criteria more stringent than the federal guidelines, and states
are free to establish criteria for pollutants for which federal
guidelines do not exist.105 The criteria are reviewable by

104. Each of these parameters is directly relevant to ocean acidification: pH
measures the acidity directly, dissolved oxygen is inversely correlated with the
eutrophication associated with local nutrient plumes, and both nitrates and
phosphates are constituent elements of such plumes. Because eutrophication can lead
to acidifying bottom waters—particularly in stratified water columns and water bodies
with long residence times—it contributes to coastal acidification. In this context,
“residence time” refers to the length of time a particular water mass remains within a
specified geographic area such as a bay or estuary. Waters with longer residence times
therefore have longer periods in which to accumulate CO2, as the waste products of the
resident animals and bacteria build up. See WASH. SHELLFISH INITIATIVE BLUE RIBBON
PANEL ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY OF OCEAN ACIDIFICATION IN
WASHINGTON STATE MARINE WATERS 33 (Richard A. Feely et al. eds., 2012).
105. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700, 712 (1994)
(The State can only ensure that the project complies with “any applicable effluent
limitations and other limitations, under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312” or certain other
provisions of the Act, “and with any other appropriate requirement of State law.”
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administrative action rather than legislation, making them
easier to adjust to reflect the rapidly developing science of
ocean acidification.
Agencies have so far been slow to translate the growing
mass of data on ocean acidification into action. In 2008,
Washington State declined to include any marine waters on its
list of impaired water bodies, resulting in a lawsuit by the
Center for Biological Diversity and a subsequent settlement. 106
As a result of that settlement, the federal EPA requested data
on the matter and considered altering the national guideline
for marine pH.107 EPA ultimately decided against adjusting its
guidance for water quality criteria with respect to pH, citing
insufficient information to change the federal standard.108 No
state has yet created a more stringent guideline. Like the
federal EPA, California’s state water board is also awaiting
more data before revising the marine pH criterion,109 and has
accordingly declined to list any marine waters as impaired for
pH.110 Other coastal states appear to be doing the same.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) . . . . As a consequence, state water quality standards adopted
pursuant to § 303 are among the “other limitations” with which a State may
ensure compliance through the § 401 certification process . . . . [A]t a minimum,
limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality standards adopted pursuant
to § 303 are “appropriate” requirements of state law.).
106. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, No. 2:09-cv-00670-JCC (W.D. Wash. 2009).
Note that Washington was not the defendant in this suit; rather, the Center for
Biological Diversity sued the federal EPA for approving Washington’s list of impaired
waters, which had not included any marine waters impaired for pH. Washington has
since labeled the acidified Puget Sound as “waters of concern.” See Water, WASH. DEP’T
OF ECOLOGY, www.ecy.wa.gov/water.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
107. Notice of Call for Public Comment on 303(d) Program and Ocean Acidification,
75 Fed. Reg. 13,537 (Mar. 22, 2010).
108. See Memorandum from Peter S. Silva, Assistant Administrator, EPA, to Center
for Biological Diversity, (Apr. 15, 2010), http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/
cwa/tmdl/upload/Memorandum-Detailing-EPA-Decision-on-Re-evaluation-and-orRevision-of-the-Water-Quality-Criterion-for-Marine-pH-for-the-protection-of-AquaticLife.pdf.
109. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., CALIFORNIA
OCEAN PLAN TRIENNIAL REVIEW WORKPLAN 2011-2013 DRAFT 15 (2011),
www.swrcb.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/ocean/docs/trirev/wrkpln2011_13.pdf
(“[M]ore research, monitoring and assessment should take place, both in California
and globally to address and understand decreases of pH (trends and effects) before
further changes to the objective or program of implementation is amended.”).
110. Memorandum from Alexis Strauss, Director, Water Division, EPA Region IX to
Tom Howard, Executive Director, State Water Resources Control Board 29-30 (Oct. 11,
2011), www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/tmdl/records/state board/2011/
ref3641.pdf.
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More stringent criteria for pH and related parameters would
land a greater number of water bodies on the 303(d) list of
impaired waters, which would in turn require the state to
develop more TMDLs. Although historically this process has
been lethargic and resource-intensive,111 it need not necessarily
be so.112 Where regional water boards develop TMDLs, such as
in California, the boards could minimize their individual costs
by collaborating to develop marine and estuarine TMDLs.113
Federal dollars are available to develop TMDLs, although
these funds are unlikely to keep pace with a growing list of
impaired waters.114
However, states have some internal incentives to act. Aiding
a locally acidifying ocean by creating a more stringent
standard could generate local benefits in the form of healthier
state fisheries, shellfish operations, and other coastal activities
dependent on water chemistry, and would guard against
lawsuits alleging that the present criteria do not adequately
safeguard existing beneficial uses. These benefits would
mitigate and could surpass the costs of adjusting the criterion.
Precisely what the right criteria might be remains an open
question. A technological challenge to setting meaningful
water quality criteria is the natural background variation in
the chemistry of state waters. For example, the existing water
quality criterion for marine pH is +/-0.2 units outside the
normally occurring range.115 Because the natural variability of
111. See O. A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 63 (2002) (citing a figure of $ 1 million per TMDL study and ten
times that for implementation of each TMDL).
112. See, e.g., CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER QUALITY CONTROL
POLICY FOR ADDRESSING IMPAIRED WATERS: REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND OPTIONS,
RESOLUTION 2005-0050 8-9 (June 16, 2005), www.waterboards.ca.gov/water issues/
programs/tmdl/docs/iw policy.pdf (describing different options for adopting TMDLs in
California, some of which require only a single board action). Of course, this does not
accelerate the TMDL development process.
113 One approach to such TMDLs would be to collectively assess the contribution of
atmospheric CO2 input on a range of marine and estuarine resources. Each regional
board could then use that assessment as an element of regional and local TMDLs,
requiring dischargers to consider such loadings as well as local inputs.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h).
115. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN: OCEAN
WATERS OF CALIFORNIA 6 (2009) [hereinafter OCEAN PLAN], www.swrcb.ca.gov/water
issues/programs/ocean/docs/2009copadoptedeffectiveusepa.pdf; see also EPA, National
Recommended Water Quality Criteria, Note P, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/
standards/criteria/current/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
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coastal pH is substantially larger than this interval,116 the
existing criterion has little or no real protective effect.117
However, any human-caused departure from an already-wide
natural range has the potential to create an extreme chemical
environment that may be fatal to many of the organisms living
in the state’s waters. In order to effectively mitigate
acidification and to protect the existing beneficial uses of
coastal waters, revised criteria should be more stringent and
tied to an absolute value of pH—or to a hybrid of numeric and
narrative criteria with data-backed benchmarks based on
ecosystem response118—rather than the widely fluctuating
natural range. 119 For example, if the vast majority of natural
variation in a coastal region occurs within pH range 7.4 to 8.4,
it may be that nearshore waters with a pH of less than 7.4
should be designated as impaired.120

According to page 181 of the Red Book [EPA 440/9-76-023, July, 1976]: For open
ocean waters where the depth is substantially greater than the euphotic zone, the
pH should not be changed more than 0.2 units from the naturally occurring
variation or any case outside the range of 6.5 to 8.5. For shallow, highly productive
coastal and estuarine areas where naturally occurring pH variations approach the
lethal limits of some species, changes in pH should be avoided but in any case
should not exceed the limits established for fresh water, i.e., 6.5-9.0.
Id.
116. See Hofmann et al., supra note 37, at 1 (describing pH variability in different
ecosystems); see also Jerry C. Blackford & Fiona J. Gilbert, pH Variability and CO2
Induced Acidification in the North Sea, 64 J. of Marine Sys. 229, 234-36 (2007) (finding
that the coastal ocean can vary by more than 1 pH unit annually).
117. Given this limitation, current criteria may not protect many of the marine
waters’ designated beneficial uses, as is required under Porter-Cologne and the Clean
Water Act, making them legally insufficient. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(2); 40 C.F.R. §
131.6(c) (2012) (EPA approval of state water quality criteria is contingent on those
criteria being sufficient to protect designated uses).
118. See, e.g., Nutrient Numeric Endpoints, S. CAL. COASTAL WATER RES. PROJECT,
www.sccwrp.org/ResearchAreas/Nutrients/NutrientCriteriaSupportStudies/
BackgroundNutrientNumericEndpoints.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library).
119. That is, if the natural pH range of waters in a hypothetical coastal region is pH
7 to 8.5, discharges causing a change of +/-0.2 are likely to have a much more severe
environmental impact at the margins of that natural range than in the center of the
range. EPA’s Red Book guideline implicitly notes as much in setting the absolute outer
bounds of permissible pH variation at 6.5 to 8.5 or 6.5 to 9. See EPA, QUALITY
CRITERIA FOR WATER 337 (1976), http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/
criteria/current/upload/2009 01 13 criteria redbook.pdf (commonly referred to as EPA
“Red Book”). However, even for pH-variable waters that sporadically reach an extreme
pH of 6.5, inputs that chronically lower the pH by 0.2 would likely jeopardize many
beneficial uses. Improved monitoring efforts will continue to increase data quality and
availability for pH.
120. With improved monitoring data, calculating a 95% confidence interval for pH of
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Criteria more stringent than the current +/-0.2 units would
help arm state resource agencies with tools to combat local
acidification. Furthermore, narrower criteria face less of a
technological hurdle now than in years past because more
accurate monitoring technologies now exist, making narrower
tolerances more easily enforceable than they would have been
when the current water quality criteria were set in the 1970s.
Finally, water quality criteria must reflect the most recent
scientific knowledge,121 and a critical mass of information now
indicates that the chronic changes in pH that have already
taken place can have large and detrimental effects on marine
ecosystems.122 This leaves states vulnerable to citizen suits
challenging the existing criteria,123 and states may prefer to
begin revisions than to defend the existing criteria in court.
B.

Criteria and TMDLs for Atmospheric Drivers of
Acidification

While controlling the total nutrient loadings and other
anthropogenic inputs to coastal waters would help mitigate
non-atmospheric-driven acidification, developing criteria and
TMDLs for p(CO2)124 and for surface fluxes of NO x and SO x
could do the same for atmospheric drivers.125 This action is
particularly relevant for coastal waters that are at greater risk
as a result of prevailing biological or chemical conditions. For
example, atmospheric nitrogen deposition could exacerbate
particular water bodies would be easily accomplished. This might define the
boundaries of probable natural variation, and allow a static water quality standard
tied to these boundaries. Note that under such a system, the classification of waters as
either impaired or non-impaired would be much more dynamic than is the case at
present.
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (“The Administrator, after consultation with appropriate
Federal and State agencies and other interested persons, shall develop and publish …
criteria for water quality accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge.”)
122. See, e.g., Doney et al., supra note 1, at 169; Wootton, supra note 34, at 18,849.
123. See supra note 106. The large amount of scientific information that has become
available since that suit was filed—well over half of the total number of papers
published on ocean acidification have been published since 2009—tends to support the
proposition that the existing standard fails to incorporate the most recent information.
124. p(CO2) indicates the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in seawater, an
important parameter in the carbonate system.
125. See generally Anil J. Antony, Shotguns, Spray, and Smoke: Regulating
Atmospheric Deposition of Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 215 (2011) (discussing the view of courts towards such regulation, in the
context of several published decisions).
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ocean acidification depending upon factors limiting the growth
of marine microorganisms locally and upon the timescale of
analysis.126 Where areas of high deposition coincide with
upwelling zones—in which colder ocean waters quickly take up
CO2 and therefore acidify more rapidly—TMDLs for
atmospheric drivers might be an especially appropriate means
of limiting inputs to the coastal ocean, guarding against
“hotspots” of acidification.
Deposition of nitrogen and sulfur compounds from the
atmosphere could contribute significantly to coastal
acidification in some hard-hit areas.127 Yet, because they are
gases, they are not often seen as water pollutants, and
agencies have rarely designated water quality criteria for
them.128 The Chesapeake Bay—in which atmospheric nitrogen
deposition has historically been greater than nitrogen inputs
from fertilizer, manure, or any point source129—now has a
TMDL for NOx,130 demonstrating the feasibility of this
regulatory tool. Other coastal regions can follow suit.
3.

Create New Water Quality Criteria for Complementary
Parameters; Create New Designated Uses

States could make two further changes to water quality
standards to improve their ability to address coastal
acidification. First, additional criteria for pH-related parts of
the carbonate system (e.g., Total Alkalinity, Dissolved
Inorganic Carbon)131 would help monitor acidifying waters

126. See Doney et al., supra note 25, at 14,580; WASHINGTON SHELLFISH INITIATIVE,
supra note 104, at 14.
127. See Doney et al., supra note 25, at 14,580. But see Hunter et al., supra note 25 ,
at 1 (suggesting a minimal role for these gases in changing coastal pH).
128. Note that some other airborne pollutants have TMDLs, the primary example
being mercury. See EPA, Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) and Mercury, http://
water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/mercury/index.cfm.
129. Appendix L: Setting the Chesapeake Bay Atmospheric Nitrogen Deposition
Allocations L-1, in EPA, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL (2010) [entire publication
hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL], www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/
FinalBayTMDL/AppendixLAtmosNDepositionAllocations_final.pdf.
130. Executive Summary ES-1, in CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, www.epa.gov/reg3 wapd/
pdf/pdf_chesbay/FinalBayTMDL/BayTMDLExecutiveSummaryFINAL122910_final.
pdf.
131. Total Alkalinity and Dissolved Inorganic Carbon are measurements used to
characterize the overall chemical environment of the ocean with respect to calcium
carbonate, the prime ingredient of shells and other hard parts in marine organisms.
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more accurately and would be valuable tools for detecting and
preventing further degradation.132 Second, states could define
new designated uses for coastal water bodies in such a way as
to improve ecological resilience. From a technical standpoint,
both steps are feasible means of adapting state Clean Water
Act implementations to better fit the emerging threat of ocean
acidification, but the latter is perhaps an easier route because
it avoids the mathematical modeling and precise thresholdsetting that new water quality criteria would entail.
A.

Additional Water Quality Criteria to Aid Carbonate
Chemistry Monitoring

Data-driven policy requires both that relevant datasets exist
and that they meaningfully inform policy decisions. One step
that would both generate data and explicitly tie the data to
policy action is to develop additional water quality criteria for
chemical parameters that are intimately linked to ocean
acidification. These parameters, for which existing datasets
have been sparse, include Total Alkalinity and Dissolved
Inorganic Carbon, two factors in the seawater carbonate
system in which pH plays a role.
There are at least two reasons to include these parameters
in the repertoire of coastal management tools. First, in
comparison with pH, these auxiliary measures are easier to
measure accurately and consistently over long periods of time.
Second, these measurements give a more accurate
understanding of biologically relevant effects such as the rate
at which shells and other hard parts dissolve in seawater.133
Consequently, creating new criteria for and measuring these
factors simultaneously with pH would generate a more

Total Alkalinity reflects the balance of charged molecules in seawater; Dissolved
Inorganic Carbon is the sum of carbon atoms contained within a set of defined
inorganic molecules. See Jean-Pierre Gattuso & Lina Hansson, Ocean Acidification:
Background and History, in OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 2 (2012), http://fds.oup.com/www.
oup.com/pdf/13/9780199591091_chapter1.pdf. Measuring these parameters allows a
researcher to calculate the other relevant parameters of the carbonate system.
132. See Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, The Limits of Water Quality
Criteria, 29 ENVTL. FORUM 34, 38 (2012).
133. See supra note 42, describing Ωarag and Ωcalcite. Note that Ωarag would also be a
good candidate for regulation under the Clean Water Act, particularly in states such as
Washington, where the shellfish industry (and, therefore, shells that dissolve in more
corrosive water) is of paramount importance.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/5

32

Kelly and Caldwell: Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Shou

2016]

TEN WAYS TO COMBAT OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

319

complete picture of the chemistry underlying ocean
acidification and its attendant biological effects. Moreover,
more precise measurements might also allow agencies to trace
acidifying plumes to their point or nonpoint sources, helping to
limit the spatial extent of regulation to most efficiently address
the real sources of the problem.
New water quality criteria for Total Alkalinity and Dissolved
Inorganic Carbon would then link explicitly to policy action
where particular coastal waters fall short of a state’s
designated standards for these measures. Such waters would
be listed as impaired under CWA § 303(d) and the state would
develop TMDLs, as described above. NPDES permits for
existing polluters would then require monitoring and
discharges appropriate for the new measurements,
simultaneously improving water quality and generating a
valuable dataset that would not exist otherwise.
This approach broadens the traditional Clean Water Act
purview somewhat, by defining water quality standards that
serve the dual purposes of information gathering and water
quality regulation. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the text of
the Act: Both Total Alkalinity and Dissolved Inorganic Carbon
constitute “pollution”134 in the same sense as heat or pH. At
present, the federal EPA does not provide guidelines for these
chemical water parameters, but states could base water
quality criteria on known kinetics of carbonate chemistry in
seawater to derive an appropriate range.135
B.

New Designated Uses for Coastal Waters

As a final use of water quality standards to combat ocean
acidification, states could use the Clean Water Act’s designated
uses provision as a safeguard for especially sensitive areas. As
described above, states must designate particular uses for each

134. Note that the Clean Water Act defines “pollutant” and “pollution” in somewhat
different terms. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (“The term ‘pollution’ means the man-made or
man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity
of water.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (“The term ‘pollutant’ means dredged spoil, solid waste,
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment,
rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged
into water.”).
135. For a discussion of the kinetics of carbonate chemistry, see Zeebe & WolfGladrow, supra note 34, at 85–139.
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water body in their jurisdiction.136 Where technology-based
standards for point sources of pollution are insufficient to
safeguard a water body’s designated use, NPDES permits will
limit discharges in an attempt to meet the appropriate water
quality standards. Waters failing to meet these standards are
then listed as impaired, as described above.
States are free to designate uses as they see fit, taking into
consideration a non-exhaustive list of uses valuable to the
public, including “protection and propagation of fish, shellfish
and wildlife” and “recreation in and on the water.”137 A state
concerned with ocean acidification may define new designated
uses for coastal waters in order to protect their ecological
resilience and ongoing value as engines of ecosystem services.
For example, Washington could designate a portion of Puget
Sound as having the use “to maintain buffering capacity
against chemical change” or “to preserve the structure and
function of the nearshore ecosystem.” These or other new uses
would maintain standards appropriate for less stringent uses;
that is, the newly designated waters would still be swimmable,
but they would also be held to higher standards. Such a change
would harmonize the CWA’s designated use provision with a
more modern understanding of ecosystem function, by
explicitly incorporating one or more ecosystem services or
processes as “uses” under the act. The change would also set a
higher bar for water quality in coastal areas of particular
concern. Where water quality is impaired relative to the newly
designated use, the state would benefit from the increased
monitoring and attention associated with the TMDL process,
described above.
4.

Use the Clean Air Act to Decrease SO x/NO x Deposition
Near Coasts

SOx and NOx are gases that form acids when dissolved in
seawater, and may consequently lower the pH of receiving
waters.138 Because of short residence times in the atmosphere,
if these compounds contribute to ocean acidification, their
136. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a) (2012).
137. Id. States must provide a public hearing before adding or removing a
designated use. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(e) (2012).
138. See Doney et al., supra note 25, at 14,580. These gases are also the cause of acid
rain.
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effects would be most acute near locations where the gases are
produced as byproducts of human industrial processes.139
Where acid gases demonstrably contribute to ocean
acidification,140 tighter ambient air quality standards for these
compounds would have the greatest impact on ocean
acidification near coal-fired power plants or similar heavy
industrial sources located near coastlines.
States could use the Clean Water Act to regulate these
airborne pollutants, for example, by using technology-based
standards and water quality-based standards, including
designated uses and water quality criteria, as described
above.141 At least some states do regulate in this way;
Maryland, for example, has developed a TMDL for NOx
deposition for waters violating the relevant criteria,142
demonstrating the practical feasibility of this regulatory tool.
However, the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) aims squarely at SOx
and NOx, both of which are criteria pollutants under that
Act.143 The CAA has functioned for over forty years to limit the
ambient concentrations of these pollutants, and has been
especially effective with respect to SOx after the 1990 CAA
Amendments established an emissions trading scheme.144 As
139. See id. at 14,581. Here, “residence time” refers to the length of time the sulfur
or nitrogen compound remains in the atmosphere before returning to the Earth’s
surface (for example, by transport in rainwater).
140. We again stress that the contribution of these compounds to coastal ocean
acidification is an open question, with at least one notable paper suggesting they have
a negligible effect. See Hunter et al., supra note 25. As more spatially detailed studies
of acidification’s causes and effects become available, we expect that the relative
importance of acid gases to coastally enhanced acidification will be determined.
141. This assumes that deposition of these compounds meets the statutory definition
of a “discharge.” See 33 U.S.C § 1362(12) (2006) (“The term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ …
means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B)
any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from
any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.”).
142. CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 130, at ES-7.
143. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–50.13 (2006) for the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, including those for SOx and NOx.
144. The several federal SOx and NOx emissions trading programs that have evolved
since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 are complex and overlapping. These
include the Acid Rain Program, NOx Trading Program, Clean Air Interstate Rule
(“CAIR”), and the recently vacated Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”); all are
implemented under the authority provided by 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651(a)–7651(o) (2012).
Note that both the CAIR and CSPAR rules have been vacated; CAIR remains in effect,
pending development of a replacement rule. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896
(D.C. Cir. 2008), vacatur stayed on reh’g 550 F.3d 1176 (2008); EME Homer City
Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). What these programs have in common
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noted above, states generally are permitted to promulgate
more stringent air quality standards than those required
federally.145 However, because SOx and NOx are subject to
federal trading schemes,146 federal preemption concerns limit
states’ ability to regulate these emissions using market-based
programs. In Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, for example,
the Second Circuit held that Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments preempted a New York state law that collected
fees for SO2 emissions allowances traded to out-of-state
polluters, and indicated that the state scheme created an
“obstacle” to the nationwide trading program.147 This case
highlights a tension between the older command-and-control
Clean Air Act rules and the more recent market-based rules.
The interaction between these sets of rules remains an area of
active legal debate.
If states were to create more stringent SOx and NOx
standards, they could avoid federal preemption and commerce
clause challenges by amending their air quality standards
without restricting the transferability of emissions credits. For
example, a state could avoid a preemption or commerce clause
challenge by lowering its overall cap on acid gas emissions and
simultaneously limiting in-state emissions to target levels.
Such command-and-control regulation would leave the existing
trading schemes unaffected—it would not directly impact other
states’ regulated entities or the interstate trading of emissions
allowances—and would ensure that the clean air benefits
accrue to the state with more stringent limits. Virginia
provides an example of such regulation, which the Fourth
Circuit upheld in 2009.148

is that each regulates SOx and/or NOx emissions by setting limits on the emissions (the
“cap”), and then allowing regulated entities to trade surplus emissions credits or
allowances. For a description of these programs and their relationships to one another,
see Clean Air Markets, EPA, www.epa.gov/airmarkets/index.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
146. See supra note 144.
147. 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003). Note also that the New York law may pose a
dormant commerce clause problem; the District Court invalidated the statute’s
restrictions on trading allowances to out-of-state parties both on commerce clause
grounds and on preemption grounds, but the Circuit Court did not reach the commerce
clause issue. Id. at 89.
148. Mirant Potomac River v. EPA, 577 F.3d 223, 230 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The
Nonattainment Provisions, as separate state regulations, do not place any restrictions
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SOx and NOx deposition can be substantial, especially in the
eastern United States, with its high concentration of coal-fired
power plants and heavy industry.149 Where these atmospheric
pollutants end up in rivers and streams, they eventually flow
to the coastal Atlantic. In some states, coastal waters carry a
nitrogen load from atmospheric sources comparable to—or
even greater than—that of terrestrial runoff. For example,
more of the nitrogen in the Chesapeake Bay comes from
atmospheric deposition than from manure and chemical
fertilizer runoff from all agricultural lands combined.150 In
these states especially, a non-negligible percentage of coastal
ocean acidification may be due to atmospheric pollutants, and
the need for increasingly stringent air pollution regulation in
these states is correspondingly stronger.
Because SOx and NOx have relatively short residence times
in the atmosphere, there are improved incentives for state and
local governments to regulate them more closely. States with
more stringent limits will tend to experience the benefits
themselves, as smaller amounts of the pollutants will be
deposited within such states. Especially in cases where
atmospheric deposition of these pollutants is a significant
contributor to coastal acidification, cleaner air could
immediately improve the chemical environment of the ocean
while paying dividends in local public health benefits.151

on participation in the EPA trading program by any affected power plant. To meet
federal compliance obligations, any power plant can buy, sell, trade, or use allowances
without restriction. To meet state compliance obligations, no power plant located in a
nonattainment area can exceed its independent state emissions cap without facing
state penalties.”); see also Sonja L. Rodman, Legal Uncertainties and the Future of U.S.
Emissions Trading Programs, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Spring 2010, at 7, 10 (discussing this
case and other cases relating to the tension between command-and-control and
market-based regulations).
149. See EPA, OUR NATION’S AIR: ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 35–36 (2010)
[hereinafter ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION], www.epa.gov/airtrends/2010.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Health Effects of Pollution, EPA REGION 7 AIR PROGRAM, www.epa.gov/
region07/air/quality/health.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (describing human health effects of criteria pollutants). Note that
lowering levels of these pollutants could also ease the environmental justice issues
associated with the disproportionate concentration of industrial air pollution deposited
in poor and minority neighborhoods.
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5.

Enhance Wastewater Treatment at Publicly Owned
Treatment Works

Sewage treatment presents a special problem for water
quality regulation, in part because of its absolute volume:
Nationwide, wastewater treatment plants process more than
thirty-two billion gallons of wastewater daily.152 Much of this
discharge volume flows to the ocean,153 increasing nutrient
loads along the coasts and triggering the acidifying cascade
described above. Implementing more stringent technologybased or water quality-based controls through NPDES permits
for Publicly Owned Treatment Works (“POTWs”) would reduce
anthropogenic nutrient loading in the coastal ocean, in turn
reducing acidification as well as associated harmful algal
blooms and anoxic zones, as described above in Section VI(1).
The federal Clean Water Act singles out POTWs as special
point sources with additional NPDES requirements beyond
those of ordinary permittees. For example, POTWs are subject
to heightened reporting requirements in their permit
applications154 and must limit their discharges to a greater
degree than the technology-based standards alone dictate.155
As a result, a state can require POTWs to minimize discharges
by altering the prevailing water quality standards.156 Where
sewage discharge significantly contributes to coastal
acidification via nutrient loading, addressing the discharge
within the context of the NPDES permitting program would be
an attractive way to alleviate this particular stressor.
Changing the prevailing technology-based standard157 for
152. EPA, CLEAN WATERSHEDS NEEDS SURVEY 1–4 (2008), http://water.epa.gov/
scitech/datait/databases/cwns/upload/cwns2008rtc.pdf.
153. For example, California alone discharges 1.35 billion gallons of treated
wastewater per day into the Pacific. HEAL THE OCEAN, CALIFORNIA OCEAN
WASTEWATER DISCHARGE REPORT AND INVENTORY 5 (2010), http://healtheocean.org/
library/detail/california_ocean_waste_water_discharge_inventory_wdi1/.
154. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(j) (2012).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2006).
156. See supra Section VI(2).
157. While the Clean Water Act does not expressly give states the power to change
technology-based standards, the power of states to create more stringent standards is
consistent with the Act, which contemplates a lead role for states in setting applicable
clean water standards, and with case law. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d
408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The role envisioned for the states under the [CWA] is a
major one, encompassing … the right to enact requirements which are more stringent
than the federal standards.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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POTWs to require tertiary treatment,158 including nitrificationdenitrification (N-DN),159 is another means of addressing
POTW-related eutrophication. N-DN is the coupled chemical
process by which bacteria remove biologically available
nitrogen from an environment. Treatment works could use NDN to lessen the impact of millions of tons of sewage on coastal
water quality, directly lowering the eutrophication that can
lead to hypoxia and local acidification. N-DN is not a
standalone aspect of municipal water treatment, but can be
added to improve the quality of already-treated effluent.
Nationally, such treatment is now required to be considered on
a case-by-case basis; such consideration must involve
evaluation of the condition of the receiving water body and the
beneficial uses for which it has been designated.160 States,
tribes, and regional bodies could apply this same analysis to
the state’s coastal POTWs with respect to ocean acidification
and related ocean issues.161 For example, where marine
receiving waters are especially vulnerable to acidification or
related water quality issues due to upwelling or freshwater
input, N-DN might be particularly appropriate.162

158. Note that the term “tertiary treatment” is nonspecific and may be used
differently by different authors. This Article uses the term to refer to a process that
removes biosolids and nutrients from receiving waters, as well as disinfecting effluent.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER FORSTER, WASTEWATER TREATMENT & TECHNOLOGY, 183
(2003); NICHOLAS F. GRAY, BIOLOGY OF WASTEWATER TREATMENT 136 (2004).
159. See FORSTER, supra note 158, at 160–68.
160. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, supra note 129. For example, New York
State requires tertiary treatment of some combined sewer overflows into the
Chesapeake River drainage. N.Y. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION, CHESAPEAKE BAY
NITROGEN, PHOSPHORUS AND SEDIMENT TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS 29 (2010),
www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdf/pdf_chesbay/NYDraftPHIWIP.pdf.
161. California’s regional water boards have required N-DN for particular facilities
in the past. For example, the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board
recently required N-DN for the Sacramento Regional Wastewater Treatment Plant.
See CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., CENT. VALLEY REGION, WASTE
DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SACRAMENTO REGIONAL COUNTY SANITATION
DISTRICT SACRAMENTO WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT SACRAMENTO COUNTY, ORDER
R5-2010-0114 (NPDES No. CA0077682) (2011), www.swrcb.ca.gov/centralvalley/
board_decisions/adopted_orders/sacramento/r5-2010-0114-01.pdf. The Los Angeles
Region had earlier required N-DN at the D.C. Tillman Water Reclamation Plant. See
CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., LOS ANGELES REGION, WASTE DISCHARGE
REQUIREMENTS FOR CITY OF LOS ANGELES DONALD C. TILLMAN WATER RECLAMATION
PLANT DISCHARGE TO LOS ANGELES RIVER VIA DISCHARGE OUTFALLS 6 Order R4-20110196 (NPDES No. CA0056227) (2011) (describing facility and its tertiary treatment,
including N-DN), www.waterboards.ca.gov/rwqcb4/board_decisions/adopted_orders.
162. State and regional authorities may also implement local effluent limits for

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016

39

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5

326 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:2

Infrastructure upgrades to treatment works are expensive.
And as ever, more stringent regulation will be politically
difficult, especially given that costs associated with upgrading
facilities would fall to cash-strapped cities and counties.163
These two facts combine to make the practical feasibility of
POTW retrofitting decidedly lower than that of other policy
options we discuss here. But the fact that POTW regulations
impact government entities rather than private industry
means the hurdles to implementation are more likely to be
financial than philosophical: Given the financial resources,
most cities and counties would probably not object to having
cleaner wastewater discharges.
Where the benefits of upgrading accrue to the city or county
in such a way as to defray the costs,164 reform is more likely to
happen. One side benefit of more stringent wastewater
treatment is improved water recycling for non-potable or
indirect potable uses (e.g., recharging groundwater), a benefit
probably most attractive to coastal counties in which
freshwater is at a premium. Reusing water in this way reduces
a municipality’s water demand—thus saving money
annually—and simultaneously avoids the substantial
greenhouse gas emissions associated with moving water from
source to tap. In jurisdictions where beach closures are
costly,165 lowering the number of closures would be a further

POTWs to ensure that they meet the requirements of their NPDES permits. See EPA,
OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT. 4203, EPA 833-R-04-002A, LOCAL LIMITS
DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE 1–3 (2004), www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/final_local_limits_
guidance.pdf.
163. Marginal costs of N-DN treatment include infrastructure for aeration and raw
materials for carbon-limited reaction steps, and may entail tens to hundreds of
millions of dollars in expenditures. Low-cost alternatives may be available. See, e.g.,
Jari P. Y. Jokela et al., Biological Nitrogen Removal from Municipal Landfill Leachate:
Low-Cost Nitrification in Biofilters and Laboratory Scale In-Situ Denitrification, 36
WATER RESEARCH 4079 (2002); Christian Fux & Hansruedi Siegrist, Nitrogen Removal
From Sludge Digester Liquids by Nitrification/Denitrification or Partial Nitritation/
Anammox: Environmental and Economical Considerations, 50 WATER SCI. & TECH. 10,
15 (2004) (noting environmental costs as well as economic costs of different methods).
164. For example, N-DN plants may have lower operating costs than conventional
plants. See Diego Rosso & Michael K. Stenstrom, Energy-Saving Benefits of
Denitrification, 3 ENVTL. ENGINEER: APPLIED RESEARCH & PRAC. 2, 2 (2007).
165. See generally PETER C. WILEY ET AL., NOAA, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA BEACH
VALUATION PROJECT: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BEACH CLOSURES AND CHANGES IN WATER
QUALITY FOR BEACHES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (2006) (modeling economic impacts of
thousands to billions of dollars, depending upon the closure scenario and duration). See
also Sharyl J. M. Rabinovici et al., Economic and Health Risk Trade-Offs of Swim
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benefit, at least partially offsetting the price of upgrading
infrastructure.
6.

Leverage CWA § 319(h) Money to Implement Enduring
Best Management Practices and Permanent NutrientManagement Improvements

Motivated in part by the failure of TMDLs to achieve
enforceable water quality protection, Congress passed the
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments (“CZARA”) in
1990 to improve nonpoint source pollution control in coastal
waters.166 The Act required states with coastal zone
management programs approved under the Coastal Zone
Management Act (“CZMA”)167 to develop and implement
coastal nonpoint source pollution control plans.168 As with the
CZMA, the federal government provided funds for planning
and implementation under CZARA.169
The Act provided that the states’ plans should be
enforceable,170 on pain of EPA withholding its approval and the
consequent loss of funding.171 However, the actual
implementation and enforcement of states’ nonpoint source
management plans is left to states, and is largely carrot-based:
The funds authorized by § 319(h) of the Clean Water Act and §
306 of the CZMA serve as ongoing incentives for states to
manage nonpoint source pollution in their coastal zones.
In states lacking the ability or the will to enforce nonpoint
source controls, resource agencies can use the CZARAassociated funds as carrots, requiring durable best

Closures at a Lake Michigan Beach, 38 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2737, 2742 (2004)
(estimating net economic loss of up to $ 37,000 per day per swimmer for closure at a
particular beach).
166. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b (2006). For a more detailed synopsis of CZARA, see Douglas
R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory
Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21,
92–93 (2002).
167. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–60 (2012).
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(f),(h).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(b)(3) provides that each plan shall contain management
measures, the implementation of which are necessary to achieve Clean Water Act
standards. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(c)(2) states “the State shall implement the program,
including the management measures.” (emphasis added).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(c).
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management practices (“BMPs”) and permanent nutrientmanagement improvements. Ideally, these improvements
would be more expensive to remove than to implement, such
that the state would not have to continue to pay nonpoint
source dischargers to maintain them. Federal money would be
used to lower barriers to entry for parties who could not (or
would not) otherwise adopt cleaner management practices, and
the improvements would be maintained after the funds were
exhausted and the barrier to entry overcome.
Some state and private actors have had success with
collaborative management strategies, pairing with agricultural
and other landowners to reduce environmental impacts in
ways that generate environmental dividends. In the context of
wetlands preservation, The Nature Conservancy has entered
into leasing agreements with select farmers in Washington’s
Skagit Valley, seasonally renting and flooding individual
agricultural fields for the use of migrating birds.172 The birds
and other wildlife—visiting just for the season—fertilize the
soil with their droppings, reducing the farmers’ need to apply
additional fertilizer. In the context of nonpoint source
pollution, Washington also provides the example of the
Nisqually River Council process,173 in which the threat of
regulation led the various agricultural, tribal, and
environmental interests to cooperate in order to better manage
the Nisqually River for salmon. The implementation of BMPs
along the Chehalis and Willapa Rivers174 offers a similar story.
172. See Farming for Wildlife, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (June 14, 2012),
www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/washington/explore/
farming-for-wildlife.xml (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library). The state of Iowa is implementing a similar program. See Iowa
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, IOWA DEP’T AGRIC. & LAND
STEWARDSHIP, www.iowaagriculture.gov/waterresources/CREP.asp (last visited Jan.
23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (describing a project using
financial incentives to encourage landowners to restore wetlands on agricultural lands,
administered through a collaboration among various levels of government and private
landowners).
173. Nisqually River Council, NISQUALLY RIVER COUNCIL, http://nisquallyriver.org/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). See
generally NISQUALLY RIVER TASK FORCE, NISQUALLY RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN (1987),
http://nisquallyriver.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/NISQUALLY-RIVERMANAGEMENT-PLAN.pdf.
174. Dairy Regulations and Coordinated Approach Help Restore Record Number of
Washington Water Bodies, EPA NONPOINT SOURCE NEWS-NOTES, May 2012, at 14
(explaining
In 2011 the state of Washington reported that 84 impaired water bodies in the
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In general, however, an entirely incentive-based system can
leave the state in the uncomfortable and unsustainable role of
paying its constituents not to pollute.175 States with more
enforceable nonpoint source regulation have the option of
wielding either the carrot or the stick. In California, for
example, the regional water boards176 implement the CZARA
and Clean Water Act restrictions.177 The water boards have
three tools with which to control nonpoint source pollution
outside of the Clean Water Act’s TMDL provision: waste
discharge requirements (“WDRs”), waivers of WDRs, and basin
plan prohibitions.178 The boards can issue WDRs for general or
specific discharges; for example, they may bar discharges that
fall outside of a particular pH range or that have a particular
nutrient content. Alternatively, boards can agree to waive
WDRs in exchange for the discharger’s application of best
management practices or for other assurances; many of the
coastal nonpoint source plan’s management measures are
administered in this way.179 WDR violations may trigger
abatement, cease-and-desist orders, or civil liability.180 Fees
associated with WDRs181 defray the costs of implementation
and secondarily discourage avoidable discharges.
These seemingly enforceable nonpoint source controls are
consistent with an overarching state policy of maintaining
Chehalis and Willapa watersheds had been restored or partially restored, thanks
in large part to widespread non-point source pollution control efforts … .
Washington’s recipe for success appears to be a combination of regulatory
requirements, stakeholder collaboration, targeted implementation and voluntary
efforts. Importantly, the success is documented by watershed-wide monitoring.).
175. Discussing a pollution-trading scheme between point and nonpoint source
polluters, Oliver Houck recently observed “[o]ne might ask why municipal residents,
many of them at the low end of the wage scale, already paying for sewage treatment of
their own wastes, should have also to pay farm sources not to pollute. The agriculture
sector includes some of the wealthiest (and most heavily subsidized) enterprises in
America.” Houck, supra note 95, at 10,225. Using federal dollars to pay nonpoint
sources to maintain BMPs year after year raises the same ethical and practical
questions.
176. See California Water Boards, CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, www.swrcb.ca.gov
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
177. California’s Coastal Commission shares authority with the water boards to
implement CZARA.
178. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., RESOLUTION NO. 2004-0030 (2004), 2004
WL 1380112, at *4.
179. See id. at *3–*6.
180. See the complete list of enforcement options. PROSIP, supra note 99, at 56–61.
181. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260(d) (2011) provides the relevant fee authority.
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water quality by using the full power and jurisdiction of the
state to do so.182 However, such measures still rely on
identified permittees for implementation, and violations are
enforceable only against those same permittees. Rather than
water quality-based enforcement, the WDRs and associated
rules parallel the technology-or management practices-based
measures in NPDES permits. The result is that nonpoint
source problems are treated like point source problems, and
most pollution is likely to remain unaccounted for.183
Solving this problem requires California and states with
similar nonpoint source programs to be enterprising in
identifying nonpoint source polluters and politically willing to
take them on. In states in which a failure to report a discharge
or a failure to file for a permit can trigger an enforcement
action,184 agencies can use these state law provisions to bring
nonpoint sources into the permitting system. An increase in
direct enforcement could curtail nonpoint source runoff from
identified sources and could be an effective way of combating a
large fraction of the runoff contributing to coastal acidification
and degraded water quality. There are no obvious legal
barriers here; rather, the feasibility of greater enforcement
measures depends entirely on the existence of the political will
and funding required to maintain a consistent presence in the
field.

182. See RESOLUTION NO. 2004-0030, supra note 178 at 3–4 (“(1) The quality of all
the waters of the State shall be protected; (2) All activities and factors that could affect
the quality of State waters shall be regulated to attain the highest water quality that
is reasonable; and (3) The State must be prepared to exercise its full power and
jurisdiction to protect the quality of water in the State from degradation.”) (citing CAL.
WATER CODE § 13000).
183. Note that the advent of pesticide permitting under NPDES—projected to
increase the number of permittees by 65%—may bring formerly nonpoint sources into
the permitting process and thus allow state, tribal, and regional agencies greater
opportunity to impose pollution restrictions beyond those required for pesticides alone.
EPA, 2010 NPDES PESTICIDES GENERAL PERMIT FACT SHEET 14–15, www.epa.gov/
npdes/pubs/proposed_pgp_fs.pdf.
184. See infra Section VI(9) for a discussion of direct enforcement actions. California
is one state for which every discharge likely to affect water quality—whether point or
nonpoint—requires the discharger to file a report with the state or regional water
board. CAL. WATER CODE § 13260.
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Participate in the National Estuary Program and the
National Estuarine Research Reserve System

States can better manage inputs into key coastal sites by
enrolling them in the National Estuary Program (“NEP”). This
program was created as part of the 1987 amendments to the
Clean Water Act185 and provides federal funds for creating and
implementing comprehensive management plans for nationally
significant bays and estuaries.186 The NEP does not set aside
estuaries as protected or research areas but rather represents
a means of grappling with nonpoint source pollution187 through
a collaborative, watershed-wide process that has been lauded
as a model of cooperative governance.188 Focusing attention on
water quality management and ecosystem health through the
NEP may avoid some of the expense of developing TMDLs and
may be a more effective means of addressing the same core
goals.
Twenty-eight bays and estuaries are presently enrolled in
the program—representing a total of nineteen states—and
state governors can nominate new water bodies for inclusion.189
Although reliable time-series data are not available, EPA data
are available and, on the whole, paint a picture of modest
success. Estuaries in the program score equal to or better than
U.S. estuaries overall in a series of water-and habitat-quality

185. 33 U.S.C. § 1330. The National Estuary Program is essentially a forum and a
source of funds for a kind of collaborative management that moves away from the topdown regulation that may alienate stakeholders to different degrees. In the words of
one NEP official, the program focuses on “kumbaya” consensus building and relies on
voluntary implementation measures. Telephone interview with anonymous EPA
employee familiar with the NEP as it functions in San Francisco Bay (Dec. 16, 2011)
(on file with authors).
186. As defined in the National Estuary Program, an estuary is “a part of a river or
stream or other body of water that has an unimpaired connection with the open sea
and where the sea water is measurably diluted with fresh water derived from land
drainage.” 33 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (2012). In plain English, an estuary is a coastal site
with a mix of fresh and saltwater.
187. See LYNN M. GALLAGHER, CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 129 (3d ed. 2003).
188. See generally Mark Lubell, Resolving Conflict and Building Cooperation in the
National Estuary Program, 33 ENVTL. MGMT 677 (2004); Mark Schneider et al.,
Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and the National Estuary Program, 47 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 143 (2003).
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1330. For existing NEP estuaries, see National Estuary Program
Study Areas, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/oceb/nep/upload/NatGeo_24x36_final_
revised.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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measures.190 The program claims to have protected or restored
over 518,000 acres of national estuarine habitat between 2001
and 2005,191 and a total of 1.3 million acres since 2000.192
Where states have existing NEP estuaries, they can make use
of federal funds to combat acidification in the estuaries’
comprehensive management plans.
The National Estuarine Research Reserve System
(“NERRS”), by contrast, is not a management program, but a
research and monitoring program administered by NOAA that
sets aside designated water bodies for long-term protection. A
state may request that one of its qualifying water bodies be
included in the system, and the federal government provides
matching funds for nominee sites. Qualifying sites are those
that are “representative estuarine ecosystems suitable for longterm research.”193 After an evaluation process194 including an
environmental impact analysis, sites that are included in the
system are “protected for long-term research, water-quality
monitoring, education and coastal stewardship,” and managed
by a state agency or university with technical assistance and
funding from NOAA.195
States may find the visibility, data collection, and funding
that accompany designation as a NERRS site to be helpful for
protecting their coasts from acidification and other threats to
water and habitat quality. Further, the NERRS program
provides matching funds for states to acquire land and waters
for inclusion in the system.196 These matching funds may be
particularly attractive for states that allow private ownership

190. EPA, NATIONAL ESTUARY PROGRAM COASTAL CONDITION REPORT, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY ES.9 (2007), http://water.epa.gov/type/oceb/nep/upload/2007_05_09_oceans_
nepccr_pdf_nepccr_exec_summ.pdf.
191 EPA, NATIONAL ESTUARY PROGRAM 2004–2006 IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW
REPORT 4 (June 19, 2008), http://water.epa.gov/type/oceb/nep/upload_2008_0709_
estuaries_pdf_2004-2005_irreportfinal_6_19_08.pdf.
192. National Estuary Program Habitat Goals, EPA, www.epa.gov/owow_keep/
estuaries/pivot/habitat/progress.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
193. 15 C.F.R. § 921.2(f) (2012).
194. See Overview, NAT’L ESTUARINE RES. RESERVE SYS., http://nerrs.noaa.gov/
BGDefault.aspx?ID=61 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (describing the process leading to designation as NERRS site).
195. See id. (describing day-to-day management).
196. 15 C.F.R. § 921.1(f).
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of tidelands, such as Washington,197 and that therefore may
have to purchase such lands in order to include them in the
federal program.198
Both NEP and NERRS are low-risk strategies for
collaborative management and research, but both require
congressional appropriations in order to maintain operations,
and so are vulnerable to changes in economic and political
conditions.199 Congress has consistently appropriated funds for
the operation of NEP and NERRS,200 but at least in the case of
NEP, the funding priority is to support existing estuaries
rather than to enroll new ones.201 The last new NEP
designation was in 1995 when a congressional appropriation
allowed it.202 Until this changes, states can focus their efforts
on mitigating the flow of pollutants into existing NEP
estuaries, which occurs in the majority of coastal states.
8.

Incorporate Ocean Acidification Impacts into
Environmental Review under State NEPA Equivalents

Fifteen states have “little NEPAs,” versions of the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).203 These statutes require
197. Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 993 (Wash. 1987) (“The state of Washington
has the power to dispose of, and invest persons with, ownership of tidelands and
shorelands subject only to the paramount public right of navigation and the fishery.”);
Washington v. Longshore, 5 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Wash. 2000) (“Once tidelands are sold to
an individual, title to the clams passes to the private property owner.”).
198 Note, however, a state need not own lands in fee simple in order to enroll them in
NERRS. 15 C.F.R. § 921.30(d).
199. Note: Congress appropriated no funds to a complementary program, the West
Coast Estuaries Initiative (Public Law 110-161), in 2011. See West Coast Estuaries
Initiative, CATALOG FED. DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE [hereinafter CFDA], www.cfda.gov/
?s=program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=0d67d410ab169dbba18aa3012dce1007 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
200. See NERRS Appropriations FY 2000–2009, NAT’L ESTUARINE RES. RESERVE
SYS., http://nerrs.noaa.gov/BGDefault.aspx?ID=492 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
201 NEP is program number 66.456, and the funding priority for 2011 was to support
the 28 existing NEP estuaries’ management plans. See CFDA, supra note 199.
202. See Frequently Asked Questions: Estuaries and Coastal Watersheds, EPA, http://
water.epa.gov/type/oceb/nep/questions.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
203. David Sive & Mark A. Chertok, “Little NEPAs” and Their Environmental
Impact Assessment Processes, SR045 ALI-ABA 801, 803 (2010). Washington, D.C., and
Puerto Rico also have similar statutes. Id. at 840. Note also that some cities require
similar emissions accounting for development projects. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH.,
ORDINANCE 122574 (Dec. 10, 2007), clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/archives/Ordinances/Ord_
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review of the environmental impact of proposed projects
involving at least some government action.204 States calibrate
the stringency of the acts by identifying which kinds of projects
require review, which impacts those reviews must assess, and
by specifying whether significant impacts must be mitigated.
Case law and the state statutes themselves have largely
defined the first and third of these controls, setting a degree of
state action (or a degree of potential impact) required in order
for a project to trigger environmental review205 and
establishing a degree of necessary mitigation.206 State
environmental agencies generally set the second control—i.e.,
the impacts that a review must include—by regulation.207
Because ocean acidification is a known effect of various
byproducts of human development—including at least CO2
emissions, NOx and SOx emissions, and eutrophication from
coastal runoff—regulatory agencies can and should include
these drivers’ contributions to ocean acidification as impacts
that environmental reviews must consider. In some states,
courts could already require review of acidification impacts
under existing statutory language. For example, in California a
court could require such analysis under the existing
greenhouse gas and water quality provisions of the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) guidelines.208 Changing
these guidelines slightly to expressly require acidification
analysis would highlight the growing scientific consensus on
the changing ocean chemistry and its importance to the state’s
122574.pdf (last visited June 24, 2016).
204. The acts often refer to “state agencies,” “public agencies,” or use similar
language. Sive & Chertok, supra note 203, at 805.
205. See, e.g., No Oil v. City of L.A., 529 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1974); H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y.
State Urban Dev. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (4th Dep’t 1979).
206. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(b) (1994) (“Each public agency shall
mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects that it carries
out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so.”).
207. See, e.g., 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617 (2012); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-020 (2012).
208. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4(b) (2012)
(A lead agency should consider the following factors, among others, when
assessing the significance of impacts from greenhouse gas emissions on the
environment: … The extent to which the project complies with regulations or
requirements adopted to implement a statewide, regional, or local plan for the
reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions …. If there is substantial
evidence that the possible effects of a particular project are still cumulatively
considerable notwithstanding compliance with the adopted regulations or
requirements, an EIR must be prepared for the project.).
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economy and coastal ecosystems. It would not be a major
regulatory change because California already demands an
accounting of greenhouse gas impacts and erosion in
environmental review.209 Massachusetts and Washington also
require some form of greenhouse gas accounting in their
analogous laws.210
Where states lack greenhouse gas accounting requirements
in their little NEPAs, courts and environmental agencies can
nevertheless require acidification-impact analysis as an aspect
of water quality. Again, making this connection more explicit
by listing acidification expressly as an impact that project
proponents must consider would highlight the issue, but is not
essential. Chemical properties (including nutrient loading and
pH) are essential measures of water quality, and proposed
projects that degrade water quality by changing the pH of
receiving waters fall squarely within the ambit of state NEPA
equivalents.211
Analyzing the contribution of a proposed project to ocean
acidification under state NEPA-style laws would be a helpful
complement to actions under the Clean Water Act in any effort
to deal with nonpoint source pollution more responsibly.
Moreover, this shift requires a bare minimum of new law or
regulation, and would underscore the growing awareness of the
real environmental threat that a fundamentally changed ocean
represents.
9.

Direct Action to Enforce: Public Nuisance and Criminal
Statutes

All states have the power to sue polluters as common law
public nuisances, and many jurisdictions also have criminal

209. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4 (2012) (greenhouse gases); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14 art. 20, app. G (2012) (environmental checklist form containing
multiple references to erosion and runoff).
210. See MASS. EXEC. OFFICE ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, REVISED MEPA
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS POLICY AND PROTOCOL (2010), www.env.state.ma.us/
mepa/downloads/GHG%20Policy%20FINAL.pdf (last visited June 24, 2016); SEPA and
Climate Change, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/sepa/
climatechange/index.htm (last visited .June 24, 2016) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
211. Cf. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, SEPA PROJECT REVIEW FORM: GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT 12 (2000), www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/sepa/project/doc/ver5guidance.doc
(listing excess nutrient runoff as a condition to be considered when listing impacts).
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statutes dealing with water pollution. The federal Clean Water
Act does not preempt state common law nuisance claims,
expressly leaving states the power to regulate water quality
more stringently.212 Federal courts have upheld state common
law claims as viable, despite the preemption of federal common
law claims,213 and these long-established background tools are
easily and relatively cheaply deployed to protect water quality.
A public nuisance is an “unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public.”214 In general, citizens lack
standing to sue for public nuisances, but where a person is
particularly harmed by a public nuisance, he or she has
standing to sue.215 Where degraded water quality jeopardizes a
coastal business, for example, the proprietor may seek to abate
the cause of that degraded water quality as a public nuisance.
State agencies seek the remedy in the absence of a plaintiff
claiming special harm. Some instances of water pollution
constitute a public nuisance per se,216 and these are
particularly attractive cases for either private or public
enforcement because of their predictable outcomes.
Examples of successful nuisance actions for marine pollution
abound, arising in a large number of jurisdictions. For
instance, commercial fishermen have successfully sued for
damages stemming from both land-based217 and ocean-based218
212. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.”).
213. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327-29 (1981); see also Int’l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) (“Nothing in the [Clean Water Act] bars aggrieved
individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.”).
214. REST. (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). Most states have followed this
approach to public nuisance. David A. Grossman, Warming Up to A Not-So-Radical
Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (2003). Note
also that California’s strong public trust doctrine reinforces the idea that the marine
waters are a public good, and as such are amenable to the application of public
nuisance doctrine. See Nat. Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal.3d 419, 441 (1983).
215. See, e.g., Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Super. Ct. of Fresno Cnty., 19 Cal.
App. 4th 334, 341 (5th Dist. 1993).
216. Id. (“Water pollution occurring as a result of treatment or discharge of wastes in
violation of Water Code section 13000 et seq. is a public nuisance per se.”) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
217. See, e.g., Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So.3d 1216, 1228 (Fla. 2010)
(holding that commercial fishermen may recover from terrestrial fertilizer storage
facility for pollution; extensively documenting case law in this area); Leo v. General
Electric Co., 145 A.D.2d 291, 292–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). But see Holly Ridge
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pollution. Nuisance actions place the costs of abatement on
polluters,219 internalizing the cost of future pollution. Further,
vicarious nuisance liability may be particularly useful in
actions against multi-level corporate entities, such as factory
farms.220
Many states have clean water statutes, with civil or criminal
penalties for polluting parties. In particular, these statutes are
likely to focus on drinking water quality.221 But because
drinking water often derives from major sources of surface
water, the laws may be more generally applicable to issues of
freshwater quality and ultimately coastal water quality.
California, for example, has statutes that prohibit the keeping
of livestock in a manner that pollutes water used for domestic
purposes.222 Because agricultural nonpoint source runoff is
such a substantial source of pollution that often otherwise goes
unregulated, these code sections may be particularly valuable
enforcement tools for state agencies.
Most states have “right-to-farm” statutes that exempt the
agriculture industry from many nuisance actions.223 Some of
these laws are breathtakingly broad: Delaware’s, for example,
states that “no state or local law-enforcement agency may
bring a criminal or civil action against an agricultural
Associates v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., 361 N.C. 531, 538 (2007) (finding
shellfish growers lacked a direct interest sufficient for intervention as of right, where
they had sought to intervene in action over civil penalty assessed against developer by
state agency for violation of sediment pollution control act).
218. See, e.g., Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981), aff’d
767 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1985).
219. ENVTL. L. INST., ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR THE CONTROL OF
NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION 23 (1997), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/
elistudy_index.cfm. (last visited June 24, 2016).
220. Of particular interest for vicarious liability for nonpoint source pollution is
Assateague Coastkeeper v. Alan & Kristin Hudson Farm, 727 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442 (D.
Md. 2010). There, the district court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, on the basis of the corporation’s alleged vicarious liability for Clean
Water Act violations at a smaller concentrated animal feeding operation (“CAFO”).
Although this case arose in the statutory – rather than common law – context, it
provides a recent reminder of the power of vicarious liability in the context of
environmental law.
221. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.54.010 (West 2011) (“Every person who shall
deposit or suffer to be deposited in any spring, well, stream, river or lake, the water of
which is or may be used for drinking purposes … any matter or thing whatever,
dangerous or deleterious to health … shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.).
222. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 116990, 116995 (West 2012).
223. See ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 219, at 25–26, for a review of these statutes.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016

51

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5

338 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:2

operation for an activity that is in compliance with all
applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and permits.”224
Others, such as New York’s, only exempt the agriculture
industry from private nuisance suits, leaving the door open to
public nuisance actions.225 California’s right-to-farm law leaves
intact nuisance actions falling under a broad swath of
statutory provisions.226 Despite the presence of various
exceptions,227 and the right-to-farm statutes’ questionable
validity under some state constitutions,228 these statutes
somewhat limit states’ abilities to abate agricultural nonpoint
source pollution.
Using either common law or statutory approaches to abate
harmful discharges directly could ameliorate coastal
acidification and improve water quality. In some cases, these
actions could be the fastest and most effective means of
mitigating a particular pollution source. Although it is
impossible to estimate the aggregate effect of these actions
with any certainty, this approach has the attractive effect of
shifting the cost of pollution onto the polluters themselves,
encouraging these polluters to minimize future pollution.
Criminal statutes229 could be of further use for state
enforcement efforts. All fifty states have criminal statutes for
water pollution, although these vary widely in their penalties
and criminal elements.230 For example, dumping waste matter
into water bodies of any kind—or on stream banks or
beaches—is a crime in California, and carries a penalty of

224. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1401 (West 2010).
225. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1300-c (McKinney 2012).
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5 (West 2012). Note also that this law only exempts
agricultural activities from common law nuisance actions when the actions are “due to
any changed condition in or about the locality.” Id. That is, the law is aimed at
preserving existing farming activities despite the encroachment of urban areas, rather
than exempting the agricultural industry from nuisance law generally.
227. See LINDA A. MALONE, ENVT’L REG. OF LAND USE § 6:15 (2011) (citing
negligence, trespass, and strict liability as alternative means of abating agricultural
runoff).
228. Id. (discussing Iowa Supreme Court’s finding that the state’s right-to-farm
statute created a de facto easement, and hence constituted a taking).
229. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.7(a) (West 2012).
230. See generally Andrew Franz, Crimes Against Water: Non-Enforcement of State
Water Pollution Laws, 56 CRIME LAW SOC. CHANGE 27 (2011) (discussing state laws
criminalizing water pollution, and the under-enforcement of these laws).
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criminal fines.231 Failing to file for a discharge permit—
whether the discharge is from a point or a nonpoint source—is
also a misdemeanor under the state’s Porter-Cologne Act.232
Although such dumping is probably not a major driver of
coastal water quality problems when compared to more routine
point and nonpoint source discharges, enforcing these laws
would be a means of deterring illegal pollution while
underscoring the seriousness of environmental crimes.
Depending upon the criminal fines and the disposition of the
revenue from those fines, this money would at least defray the
expense of enforcement.
Finally, a rarely invoked example of abatement action is a
state agency or municipality suing another agency or
municipality for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty.
Where states have waived sovereign immunity with respect to
this kind of suit, as is the case in California,233 a coastal or
downstream community would have recourse against inland or
upstream government entities that breach an identifiable and
nondiscretionary duty to safeguard water quality.234
10.

Practice Smart Growth and Smart Land Use Changes

Changes in planning and land use can reduce many of the
coastal inputs likely to exacerbate local ocean acidification,
while simultaneously contributing to a larger-scale effort to
minimize the CO2 emissions that create a background level of
ocean acidification worldwide. This approach has the
advantage of dealing with both the short term/local and longer
term/global drivers of acidification in tandem. We address
these non-CO2 drivers first, and then discuss direct CO2
management below.
Many states have smart-growth or anti-sprawl guidelines,
but ultimately land use decisions are canonical functions of

231. CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.7(a). Oregon has an analogous law. OR. REV. STAT. §
468.946 (2012).
232. CAL. WATER CODE § 13261 (West 2012).
233. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.6 (2012) (establishing a mandatory duty of public entity
to protect against particular kinds of injuries.).
234. For example, municipalities, counties, and public agencies may sue one another
over alleged violations of the California Environmental Quality Act. See, e.g., L.A.
Cnty. Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Cnty. of Kern, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1558 (2005).
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local government.235 Hence, local governments have a
significant role to play in combating ocean acidification, CO2
emissions, and poor water quality, and can feasibly do so
through a subtle shift in how they make land use decisions.
Local governments can take a number of steps to mitigate
nonpoint source runoff that negatively impacts coastal waters
by decreasing impermeable surfaces, increasing riparian
buffers, and increasing the efficiency of stormwater
management. Local governments have already taken a number
of steps to achieve these land use goals. For example, every
general plan in California requires a transit-friendly
circulation element,236 and requires cities to identify streams
and riparian areas that may accommodate floodwaters for
purposes of stormwater management.237 Transit-friendly
circulation means greater densities, fewer vehicle miles
traveled,238 and less voracious conversion of habitat to
impermeable streets and sidewalks.239 By safeguarding
streams and riparian areas, a local government can ensure
better flood accommodation while preserving buffers between
the urban street and the waters that flow directly to the ocean.
Other state statutes require that local subdivisions properly
provide for erosion control,240 and some single out special land
use classes (such as forestry) for special attention to erosion
and pollution control.241 These and other land use measures
235. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning, 34 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121 (2009) (reviewing land use practices and other
sustainability laws in state and local jurisdictions across the United States).
236. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65302(b)(1) (West 2011).
237. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65302(d)(3).
238. See infra notes 255–68 and accompanying text for a discussion of transitfriendly circulation.
239. Transit plans may be eligible for federal subsidies. See, e.g., Congestion
Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/air_quality/cmaq/ (last visited
Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
240. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65596(f) (“The [subdivision] ordinance shall specifically
provide for proper grading and erosion control, including the prevention of
sedimentation or damage to offsite property.”); see also id. § 66646.2 (enabling the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission to identify areas subject to
erosion and inundation due to sea level rise).
241. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4581–92. Note in particular that:
A timber harvesting plan may not be approved if the appropriate regional water
quality control board finds … that the timber operations proposed in the plan will
result in a discharge into a watercourse that has been classified as impaired due to
sediment pursuant to [CWA § 303(d)] …. § 4582.71(a).
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that prevent the wastes of urban life from entering surface
waters and the coastal ocean ultimately protect nearshore
ecosystems and the services they provide.242 Local land use
controls also tend to place the costs of pollution prevention
measures on those best equipped to control design and costs,
the project developers.
Little NEPAs can be used to effectuate systemic change—
because county or city actions to adopt or amend general plans
(also called “comprehensive plans”), or to approve tentative
subdivision maps, are steps that typically trigger state
environmental review statutes.243 Therefore, a state
environmental review statute that requires analysis of ocean
acidification impacts would produce broader change in land
use regulation simply because it would influence long-term
planning.
More than most other states, California has an additional
and powerful tool with which to shape land use decisions in
favor of coastal protection. The California Coastal Commission
can use its broad authority to prevent land use practices that
negatively impact the nearshore environment.244 The Coastal
Act authorizes the Commission to maintain and restore marine
resources, including coastal water quality and biological

Id. § 4582.71(a). Given the large number of state water bodies on the 303(d) list, this
provision could be especially powerful to minimize sediment and nutrient loadings
from forestry activities. Id.
242. A good example of such proactive work is Portland, Oregon’s “Tabor to the
River” watershed-wide restoration effort. This program integrates social and
environmental goals to improve water quality and riparian habitat in the Willamette
River basin. See Tabor to the River, PORTLAND BUREAU ENVTL. SERVS., http://
www.portlandoregon.gov/bes/47591 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library). In particular, the program focuses on sewer and
stormwater management, as well as tree planting.
243. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 § 15378 (2012); CAL GOV’T CODE, § 65456;
Christward Ministry v. Super. Ct., 184 Cal. App. 3d 180, 193–94 (1986); City of Lomita
v. City of Torrance, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1069 (1983). Note that where changes to
general plans are done by ballot initiative—rather than by agency approval—those
changes are not subject to CEQA review. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 § 15378(b)(3); DeVita
v. Cnty. of Napa, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 793–795 (1995). As to subdivision maps, see CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21080.
244. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30230 (“Marine resources shall be maintained,
enhanced, and where feasible, restored.”); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30231 (“The
biological productivity and the quality of coastal waters, streams, wetlands, estuaries,
and lakes appropriate to maintain optimum populations of marine organisms and for
the protection of human health shall be maintained and, where feasible, restored.”).
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productivity.245 Proactively mitigating stressors arising from
coastal land uses within the Commission’s jurisdiction—which
may include nutrient runoff from nonpoint sources, an
otherwise difficult issue to tackle—is within the Commission’s
mandate and is a significant policy tool that is available
without any need for change to existing law.246
Other coastal states have coastal management agencies with
varying degrees of centralization and authority. With the
exception of Alaska,247 every coastal state has an approved
coastal management program under the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act.248 New York, for example, has an Office of
Communities and Waterfronts249 that has developed a set of
coastal policies250 guiding some land use decisions along the
shore. By contrast, Florida’s coastal program weaves together
eight state agencies and five water management districts.251 To
the degree that states’ CZMA-implementing agencies influence
coastal land use planning and decisionmaking, these agencies
can minimize inputs into the nearshore environment and
ameliorate coastal acidification accordingly.
Efforts to make general plans more responsive to issues in
the nearshore environment could be bolstered by the support of
local marine industries and residents, all of whom will benefit
from a healthier coastline. Politics and tax dollars are more

245. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30230–1.
246. Note that the Coastal Commission shares responsibility with the state and
regional Water Boards in implementing the Nonpoint Source Program Strategy and
Implementation Plan. PROSIP, supra note 99, at v. The Commission’s authority is not
restricted to implementation of the Plan, but rather by the Coastal Act. See CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 30004(b), 30005.5, 30011.
247. Alaska withdrew from the federal coastal zone management program on July 1,
2011. 76 Fed. Reg. 39857 (July 7, 2011).
248. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466; see States and Territories Working on Ocean and
Coastal Management, NOAA, http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/mystate/welcome.
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(showing locations of states and territories with approved issues, and offering details
on each).
249. Office of Communities and Waterfronts, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, www.dos.ny.gov/
communitieswaterfronts/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
250. State Coastal Policies, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE COASTAL MGMT. PROGRAM,
www.dos.ny.gov/communitieswaterfronts/pdfs/coastalpolicies.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
251. FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., FLORIDA COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM GUIDE
11 (2011), www.dep.state.fl.us/cmp/publications/fcmp_guide.pdf.
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likely to favor changes where coastal industries affected by
ocean acidification, such as shellfish fisheries, finfish fisheries,
and tourism, significantly influence the local economy.
Similarly, where urban redevelopment funds and other antisprawl incentives are available, municipalities should find it
easier to budget for actions to combat ocean acidification
locally.
VII. DIRECT CO2 MANAGEMENT
Despite its critical importance, we did not include direct CO 2
management among the ten points above because of the
extensive existing literature on the subject,252 and because of
the relatively unfavorable alignment of incentives for state,
tribal, and local governments to bear the cost of reducing
emissions in exchange for a diffuse, global benefit.
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude this paper without at least
briefly discussing the role of subnational governments in
reducing CO2 directly.
Government entities may act to manage CO2 directly either
by regulation (e.g., via the Clean Air Act), or by using
governmental spending power (e.g., greener purchasing,
renewable energy portfolios, etc.). Coastal states account for a
substantial portion of the nation’s carbon emissions,253 and
these emissions are generated in large part by the states’
transportation and energy sectors.254 And of course, the
national emissions of the United States constitute a
substantial fraction of the world’s emissions.255 While state or

252. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); Jonathan S. Masur &
Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L.
REV. 1557 (2011).
253. California, Florida, Louisiana, and New York were among the top ten emitting
states in 2010, according to EPA data. See EPA, STATE CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FOSSIL
FUELS COMBUSTION, 1990–2010 DATA, www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/resources/state_
energyco2inv.html.
254. Id.
255. The United States accounted for approximately 16.4% of the world’s emissions
in 2010. See Preliminary CO2 Emissions 2010, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CTR.,
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/co2_emis/Preliminary_CO2_emissions 2010.xlsx (last
visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (listing total U.S.
emissions in 2010 as 1497864.583 thousand metric tons of carbon and world total as
9138791.143 thousand metric tons of carbon; U.S. emissions divided by world total
equals 0.1639, or 16.4%). California’s per capita emissions are greater than those for

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016

57

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5

344 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:2

local emissions reductions will not in themselves be globally
significant, reducing the total amount of anthropogenic CO2
that a given state adds to the atmosphere is an absolutely
essential step towards mitigating the primary driver of global
ocean acidification.256
But where the incentives to reduce emissions are so far
small or nonexistent, jurisdictions are unlikely to act unless
they experience some more immediate and tangible benefit.
This immediate and tangible benefit is most likely to arise in
the context of local land use changes, which will pay local
dividends over short time horizons while diminishing
emissions. For example, increasing urban density to reduce
vehicle miles traveled is likely to be an especially effective step
to reduce CO2 emissions257 and has many positive side benefits
for cities. Greater population density can increase municipal
tax revenues and pay cultural dividends, all while reducing
emissions from vehicle miles traveled.258 Going beyond
incentives for denser development and greener building
codes—both of which largely impact future infrastructure—to
reach existing infrastructure would provide large energy and
emissions savings for many cities, particularly since these
programs can be extremely cost effective.259
many large nations, including Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, INVENTORY OF CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 TO 2004 20 (Figure 11) (2006), www.energy.ca.gov/
2006publications/CEC-600-2006-013/CEC-600-2006-013-SF.pdf. In 2004, California
emitted a total of approximately 363.8 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalents (“mmtCO2-eq”), of which 188 mmtCO2-eq (51.7%) was from the
transportation sector. Id. at 25.
256. Some reductions may also be required under state law. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2012) (requiring 1990 emissions levels in California by
2020).
257. For example, California’s Senate Bill 375 (Steinberg), chaptered Sept. 30, 2008,
provides modest incentives for denser and more transit-friendly development in
California. S.B. 375, 2007–2008 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); see also KING CNTY., WASH.,
PROPOSED MOTION No. 2011-0208.1 7 [hereinafter CLIMATE MOTION] (2011), http://
your.kingcounty.gov/dnrp/climate/documents/2011_Climate_Motion.pdf (similar).
258. Id.
259. See FED. ENERGY MGMT. PROGRAM, OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE BEST
PRACTICES: A GUIDE TO ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY (RELEASE 2.0) 2.3 (2004),
www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/omguide_complete.pdf (“It has been estimated that
[operations and maintenance] programs targeting energy efficiency can save 5% to
20% on energy bills without a significant capital investment.”); see also LEVIN NOCK &
CLINT WHEELOCK, PIKE RESEARCH, ENERGY EFFICIENCY RETROFITS FOR COMMERCIAL
AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), www.srmnetwork.com/pdf/
whitepapers/Energy_Efficiency_Retrofits_Jul10.pdf (estimating average payback time
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State and local governments can also save substantial
amounts of money by moving to greener sources for
government acquisitions.260 Small examples of more emissionsfriendly purchasing policies include many cities’ and states’
ban on government-purchased bottled water261 and San
Francisco’s vehicle fleet reduction.262 Cities and counties can
also change their energy portfolios toward increasing
renewables, as King County, Washington has done.263
Finally, state and local governments can avoid increasing
their emissions by obtaining water in an energy efficient
manner. Desalination projects, under consideration in a
variety of states, will have enormous CO2 footprints,264 and the
relevant governmental agencies must carefully weigh the value
of these and other coastal industries against the impacts of
CO2 on their ocean. Water recycling and conservation is likely
to be much cheaper than desalination, and comes with large
emissions reductions.265 These and other CO2 management
of slightly over one year for energy efficiency projects). Corning, a major manufacturer
of glass and ceramics, has reported striking returns on investment (80–100%) from
energy efficiency projects, including combined heat-and-power plants. See PETER
GARFORTH ET AL., CHANGING CORPORATE ENERGY CULTURE: THE CORNING, INC. AND
NYSERDA PARTNERSHIP, 3–86 (2007), www.eceee.org/conference–proceedings/
ACEEE_industry/2007/Panel_3/p37/ (thanks to Brad Warren of the Sustainable
Fisheries Partnership for providing this reference).
260. See, e.g., KING CNTY., 2010 ANNUAL GREEN REPORT 2 (2010), http://
your.kingcounty.gov/dnrp/library/dnrp-directors-office/climate/2010-annual-greenreport.pdf (reporting a county savings of $ 1 million in 2010 alone for buying
“environmentally preferable products”).
261. See, e.g., Bottled Water Banned, CITY OF MILL VALLEY, www.cityofmillvalley.
org/index.aspx?recordid=231&page=34 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library); Timothy B. Wheeler, Maryland State Offices Going off
the Bottle, BALT. SUN, Sept. 30, 2011; Sharon P. Chan, Seattle Giving Bottled Water the
Boot, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008.
262. San Francisco Office of the Mayor, Exec. Directive No. 09-01 (Jan. 12, 2009).
263. King County will implement its 2010 Energy Plan to achieve 50% of its energy
needs from renewables by 2015. CLIMATE MOTION, supra note 257, at 11.
264. Depending upon the desalination process used, plants use between 4–12 kWh of
thermal energy and 1.5–7 kWh of electric energy to desalinate a single cubic meter of
water. See Sabine Lattemann & Thomas Hopner, Environmental Impact and Impact
Assessment of Seawater Desalination, 220 DESALINATION, MAR. 2008, at 1, 10. The
authors note a mid-sized desalination plant uses as much energy annually as 10,300
four-person households. Id. Emerging technologies may lower the energy demand of
desalination. See, e.g., M. Busch & W. E. Mickols, Reducing Energy Consumption in
Seawater Desalination, 165 DESALINATION, AUG. 2004, at 299. However, carbon
emissions from desalination efforts in the United States are likely to remain a serious
environmental cost of the process for years to come.
265. Seawater desalination is roughly nine times as energy intensive as surface
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efforts are the beginnings of the broader policy changes
necessary to combat global ocean acidification.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Ocean acidification sits at the intersection of water and air
quality issues. Although the primary driver of worldwide
acidification is atmospheric CO2, other atmospheric (SO x/NO x)
and non-atmospheric (e.g., nutrient) inputs may contribute to
large chemical changes in some coastal regions. Consequently,
state, tribal, and local governments can mitigate a significant
portion of acidification’s harms through smaller-scale actions
as we work toward global CO2 solutions. That they can do so
without serious environmental tradeoffs, in ways consistent
with existing environmental priorities, is especially fortunate.
These government entities have no shortage of tools at their
disposal. In this Article, we have provided a short list as a
starting point for action, but the list could have been much
longer. New and better laws are of course welcome to help
tackle this emerging environmental issue, but more valuable in
actually solving the problem will be a more favorable
alignment of costs and benefits as the contours of the threat
become clearer.
It is difficult to persuade a local, state, or tribal government
to spend money out of its very limited budget to mitigate an
environmental problem, when the precise harm is uncertain
and lies largely in the future. Ocean acidification is not yet a
priority for many jurisdictions,266 and that is hardly surprising
given the list of challenges facing all levels of government.
Although there are significant benefits to mitigating
acidification sooner rather than later—especially given the
possible nonlinear impacts of environmental change—the main
benefits are in the form of future harm reduction. This kind of
water desalination. See BEVAN GRIFFITHS-SATTENSPIEL & WENDY WILSON, THE RIVER
NETWORK, THE CARBON FOOTPRINT OF WATER 15 (2009), www.rivernetwork.org/sites/
default/files/The%20 Carbon%20Footprint%20of%20Water-River%20Network-2009.pdf
(stating that desalination is seven times as energy intensive as groundwater, which in
turn is 30% more intensive than surface water).
266. A notable exception is Washington State, where the aligned interests of treaty
tribes and the shellfish industry led the governor to announce the formation of a blue
ribbon panel on ocean acidification. Press Release, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Gov.
Gregoire Announces New Initiative to Create Jobs, Restore Puget Sound, (Dec. 9,
2011), www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2011/gov_20111209.html.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss2/5

60

Kelly and Caldwell: Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Shou

2016]

TEN WAYS TO COMBAT OCEAN ACIDIFICATION

347

benefit is routinely and systematically undervalued.267
There are good reasons to believe that ocean acidification
will become a higher priority in the future. First, the direct
harm to ecosystems and industries dependent upon them is
likely to get worse as the ocean becomes more acidic. As
economic harms increase, we expect efforts to mitigate these
harms to increase proportionately. Conversely, the benefits of
combating ocean acidification will become both clearer and
nearer in time as the cost of inaction grows. More certain and
more immediate benefits tend to be valued more highly, and
therefore benefit from greater incentives for government
action. Third, a wider spectrum of interests will likely find
common cause as the threats of acidification become more
tangible and widespread. The resulting political pressure
should be a substantial incentive for governments to act.
Whether these changes will come to pass in time for coastal
management to influence the environmental outcome is an
open question. At present, the ocean appears to be acidifying at
a rate faster than at any other time in the geologic record.268
We are already in a no-analog future.269 We hope that this
Article provides a useful set of measures for those government
entities that want to combat ocean acidification now, as well as
a prompt to those governments who do not yet realize the
value of doing so.

267. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation, 24
ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 587–88 (1997).
268. See Richard E. Zeebe, History of Seawater Carbonate Chemistry, Atmospheric
CO2, and Ocean Acidification, 40 ANN. REVS. EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 141, 160 (2012);
Barbel Honisch et al., The Geological Record of Acidification, 335 SCI. 1058, 1058
(2012); see also Kump et al., supra note 30, at 105–06:
([M]uch of humanity is, in effect, engaged in a collective and deliberate effort to
transfer carbon from geological reservoirs to the atmosphere as CO2. The resulting
rate of environmental change very likely far exceeds that associated with past
greenhouse transient events, and will have been exceeded in the geological record
only by bolide impacts of the sort that caused the K/T extinction [i.e., of the
dinosaurs, among many, many other species] 66 million years ago. Lesser events
in the geologic past have left an indelible imprint on the geologic and biotic record.
“Business as usual” combustion of fossil fuels, unless accompanied by an
aggressive and successful program of carbon capture and storage, is likely to leave
a legacy of the [present] as one of the most notable, if not cataclysmic, events in
the history of our planet.).
269. See generally Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCI. 823 (2007);
J. B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the
No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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